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As we enter the Twenty First Century, the disparate threads of globalisation are redefining
how states interact with each other and magnifying the significance of their actions. In a
world defined by global markets and global threats, the ripples caused by state interaction
reach out across the globe throwing up new challenges and forcing us to reconsider the wide-
spread consequences of state relations. In this light, secure and reliable sources of energy
have become central to the economic and security formulations of states. Thus, it is with this
understanding that I wish to explore the nature of the relationship between China and Japan
and the extent to which China's increasing demand for energy is creating intense competition
with Japan over international sources of supply.
The East Asian region has become one of the most significant manufacturing centres in the
world and the concentration of such industrial capacity results in increasing demand for
energy resources to power its factories and fuel its vehicles. Compounded by exponential
Chinese economic growth and rapidly expanding vehicle markets as well as rail networks,
China will need to import more oil and gas from many of the same sources as Japan -
resulting in competition, which has security implications for the states within the East Asian
region. Such implications range from global issues surrounding higher oil prices - driven up
substantially by increased Chinese demand - and the repercussions tor the economies of East
Asia which are almost entirely reliant on imported oil, to issues of strategic reserves and
secure transportation routes. Indeed, as Dorian has illustrated,
Rapid energy growth in China is leading to dramatic impacts
throughout the world in terms of commodity markets and
prices, and within China, growing thirst for energy is creating a
new sense of urgency and energy insecurity. Indeed, the means
by which Beijing chooses to deal with its energy security will
not only affect the Chinese economy, but the global economy
as well. China's energy needs have global implications today,
as was witnessed last year through competition with Japan for
imported oil from Russia. Ultimately the US, China, and Japan
will be vying for the same Middle Eastern crude oil. Over the
next two decades, China will play a larger and larger role in the
Middle East since the country is so dependent on foreign oil
imports, as well as Central Asia, West Africa, and other parts
of the world which could help meet China's growing energy
. I
reqUirements
The sheer complexity of the relationship between China and Japan, built on layers of
hundreds of years of history, including the tumultuous twentieth century that saw both states
follow remarkably different paths of ideological development, leaves the nature of their
relationship into the future extremely difficult to determine. However, by tracing and
following three important strands of history, nationalism and leadership, focussed against the
significant nexus of security concern and resource competition, it appears that growing
Chinese demand for energy resources, namely oil and gas, will exacerbate tense relations
with Japan, creating the potential for open conflict in the foreseeable future. Thus, 'open
conflict' can be understood in terms of the foreign policy imperatives of both states and the
legal, political and military outcomes that may result from these foreign policy decisions.
I J. Dorian, "Growing Chinese energy demand: dramatic global implications", Conference Paper, Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.e. 23 March 2005
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To arrive at this conclusion necessitates that the role of history and the growth of mutually
antagonistic nationalisms be understood and contextualised against the backdrop of a steadily
globalising world where economic prosperity depends in large part on access to secure
energy resources. The ambiguity of this relationship that is characterised by both increasing
levels of economic interaction and heightened levels of tensions is difficult to reconcile and,
as such, I intend to examine the specific role that competition for oil and gas resources plays
in fermenting tension between the two states and determining its influence on policy
formulation and the likelihood of it leading to open conflict.
In attempting to reconcile the diverse facets of Sino-Japanese relations in such a way that a
single concrete conclusion is reached would be contested by Singer who argues that "no
political event ever occurs for one reason alone,,,2 and arguing that growing Chinese demand
for energy resources creates the potential for open conflict with Japan in the foreseeable
future, would be seen by many as just such an example. However, this thesis seeks to show
that through a combination of security dilemma and mutual mistrust based on historical
precedent and the formation of enemy images a backdrop has been created against which
other factors that might influence decision makers are focused. In this way, the various
dynamics that drive policy choices are formulated around the combined threads of history,
nationalism and leadership and the manner in which these factors build upon themselves over
time to arrive at a certain conclusion. Thus, the reassertion of Japanese nationalism, the
emergence of a resurgent Chinese nationalism forged in the fires of virulent anti-Japanese
rhetoric, and a mutually held cultural adherence to a historically-based perspective and
2 David Singer, "Armed conflict in the former colonial regions: from classification to explanation"in
Vande, Goor, Rupesinge and Sciarone,(Eds), Between Development and Destruction London: Macmillan,
1996, p 35
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understanding ofeach other's actions, combine in such a way as to propel the strategically
important issue of energy to the forefront of Sino-Japanese tensions.
This foundation of distrust that marks the Sino-Japanese relationship results in large part on
perceptions of threat that can be formulated in terms of classic security dilemma - a key
concept of the realist paradigm, which maintains that actions to increase one's security may
only decrease the security of others and lead them to respond in ways that decrease one's
own security.3 With this understanding, Chinese economic growth that has resulted in
exponential increases in demand for oil and gas, along with Japanese moves to assert
influence on the world stage commensurate with its economic might, are all perceived as
threatening by both states respectively. Thus, I will attempt to illustrate that besides what
Levy4 describes as the realist paradigm of states which posits that sovereign states act
rationally to advance their security, wealth and power in an anarchic system, the present-day
disputes and areas of realist tension are founded on a significant basis of historical mistrust.
Once the historical foundation ofthe relationship has been constructed, and I have explored
the nature of how nationalism and leadership combine to cement certain historical
perceptions, I will examine two critical geopolitical zones of direct Sino-Japanese
competition: the East China Sea and the South China Sea in the second and third chapters
respectively. Sino-Japanese relations at the moment are characterised by several areas of
strain, the most significant of which in terms of the nexus of security concern and resource
3 Jack Levy, "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate war - A levels of analysis approach"in Cracker,
Hampson and Aall, Turbulent Peace: The challenges ofManaging International Peace, Washington D.e.:
United States institute of Peace Press, 200 I, p.7
4 Ibid
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competition is the Chunxiao natural gas field that lies in a disputed area near the Senkakul
Diaoyu islands claimed by both states in an area of overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone in
the East China Sea. Chinese claims to these islands and others in the South China Sea such
as the Spratlys provide a backdrop of increasingly chauvinistic foreign policy in the region
emboldened by economic growth and resultant military capability. Yet in terms of Sino-
Japanese relations, the Koizumi administration, which left office in October 2006, was at the
forefront of a progressively more nationalistic impetus in Japan to throw off its war guilt and
take a more forceful role on the world stage commensurate with its economic might. It is
under these conditions and considering the marked worsening of relations between the two
states in 2005 that the competition for increased and diverse energy resources is taking place.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are found on the end reaches of the chain of tiny islands that
make up the Ryukyu Islands. However, because these islands are close enough to China,
both countries' EEZ not only overlap but also their sovereignty claims over them mean that
natural gas deposits which are believed to be present in the surrounding waters are hotly
contested. As the Economist describes, "China has been sending research and test-drilling
ships into what Japan claims as its Exclusive Economic Zone, north-east of the islands, in the
hope of getting a share of oil and gas deposits there, or say some Japanese politicians, to map
the sea bed for Chinese submarines."s Japan then responded by issuing drilling rights to
Japanese companies - a move that was described in Beijing as a "serious provocation,,,6 and
5 "So hard to be friends", The Economist, (March 232005),
http://www.economist.com/printerfriendly.cfm?story ID=3 786409
6 "Asian giants keep up war of words", BBC News, (15 April 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/?/hi/asia-
pacific/4443307.stm
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one that undoubtedly increases regional tensions. Beijing and Tokyo unsuccessfully
concluded working-level talks onjoint exploration of these natural gas fields in March 20067.
Thus when considering Sino-Japanese resource competition, it must be borne in mind that all
interactions between the states are coloured by their history and their mutually-held
perceptions of each other's intentions. Consequently, in view ofthe role of energy
competition and security in East Asia, May has noted: "this growing need for energy, in a
world with finite low-cost resources and finite capacity to deal with the end products from
energy use, may aggravate existing tensions."g Therefore, it appears that that the role of
history and perceptions thereof, coupled with rising nationalist sentiments in both countries,
will continue to underpin and colour Sino-Japanese relations for some time. Added to this is
the perception by both countries that diplomacy in the region, like scarce energy resources,
are a zero-sum game, an understanding that seems intimately linked with the combined role
of historical perspective and security fears in influencing the formulation of policy for both
countries and the mutual understanding of their respective motives.
The Economist points out that there is plenty ofevidence to suggest that Asia's two great
powers are edging closer towards one another - in 2004, for instance, China overtook the US
to become Japan's biggest trading partner while Japan was China's leading trade partner for
the period 2000 to 2004. Added to this, both countries are intimately involved in the efforts
to launch an East Asian Community, they share interests in maintaining exchange rate
7 "China pouring trouble on gas rich waters", Yomiuri Shimbun, (8 March 2006),
http://vomillri.co.jpidv/editoriaI/20060308TDY04004.htm
8 Michael May, "Energy and Security in Asia", Asia Pacific Research Centre, Stanford University (1998),
http://iis-db.standford.edu/pubs/l0043/mayfront.pm.pdf
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stability between the Yen and the Yuan, they are the biggest buyers of US Treasury bonds,
and there are increasing levels ofcooperation between their central banks and finance
ministries.9 This economic interdependence takes the form of massive Japanese investments
in China and the associated influx of technology and advanced machinery to feed the
insatiable 20 year economic growth that China has experienced since the mid 1980s. For its
part, the high trade volumes and the seemingly endless opportunities that the vast Chinese
market appear to ofter, has helped the recession-trapped Japanese economy to survive the
difficult decade of the 1990s following the so-called burst of the Japanese' bubble' economy
that had developed throughout the 1980s. However, despite these recent cooperative and
positive developments, "there has recently been a lot more evidence for the opposite view."lo
Namely, that a variety of tensions are beginning to characterise Sino-Japanese relations.
Beyond the central issue of energy resources that are linked to the territorial disputes, there
are questions of fishing rights associated with those claims and greater economic and trade
tensions. Japan has expressed frustration at the reluctance of China to float - and
consequently revalue - its currency, and the anti-Japanese riots that flared across China in
2005 highlighted the Chinese perception that the influx of Japanese firms into China
constitutes a form of economic imperialism.
A further area of tension revolves around feelings in many parts of Asia - especially China -
that Japan has not atoned adequately for its imperialist actions during World War n. In many
ways, such attitudes underscore the importance of historical perspective in understanding




present situations and tensions. For instance, special ire is reserved for visits by sitting
Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo.ll Prime Minister Koizumi's five
visits to the shrine have led to howls of protest from South Korea and, particularly, the
Chinese who feel that because those venerated at the shrine include convicted war criminals,
Japan has not shown sufficient remorse for its actions across Asia during the Second World
War. Whilst many believe that Chinese objections to prime ministerial visits to the shrine are
purely instrumental in the sense that varying forms of aid and moral advantage can be
achieved through playing the 'history card', the fact remains that Yasukuni is a factor in
Sino-Japanese relations. Added to this, is the issue of Japanese school textbooks, which are
believed in China to lack adequate details of the horrors of Japanese activities in China
during the 1930s and early 1940s. 12
A further contentious issue-area that marks the relationship today is that of Japan's attempts
to enhance its political status to match its considerable economic weight, by for instance,
looking to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, or moving to
reinstate itself as a less-hamstrung member of the international community. Such interests
have led to cries of alarm from Beij ing that Japan is starting down the road of aggressive
imperialism again. This issue (along with anger over the newly published Japanese
textbooks) led to virulent anti-Japanese demonstrations and product boycotts in China
throughout April 2005. 13
I1 BBC News, "Japan's controversial shrine", http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pf/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/ I330223.stm
12 Qin Jize, "Experts slam Japan's incendiary school book", China Daily (7 April 2005)
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04-07/content 431948.html
13 Editorial: "Anti-Japan protests"the Asahi Shimbun (April 82005) http://www.asahi.com/english/Hcrald-
asahi/TKY200504080143.htrnl
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The drive to procure varied and secure supplies of oil and gas is not only a central element in
stoking Sino-Japanese tensions but also is becoming a predominant feature of foreign policy
formulation in both Japan and China. With regard to these tensions, Kenny describes the
tomfoolery associated with rival proposals made to construct a trans-Siberia oil pipeline - the
first deal signed between the Chinese government and the Russian oil giant Yukos fell apart
when the company fell foul of Russian President Vladimir Putin's demand for back taxes,
only for the Japanese to propose a sweeter deal including funding and a more diversified end
market including South Korea and additional funding for other projects in the Russian Far
East. 14 For its part, the Russian government appears to be stalling just enough to keep China
and Japan increasing the stakes for a piece of what would be a vitally important source of
energy supply.
China's drive to find new suppliers of energy is taking Sino-Japanese tensions global, from
Russia to South America and Africa. Ernest Wilson, in a testimony before the sub-
committee on Africa at the US House of Representatives in 2005 noted that China imported
25% of its oil from Africa in 2004 at a value of approximately US$IO Billion 1s. This has
coincided with large aid packages and strategic political support for countries such as Sudan
where, as Kenny describes, China has "bought a major share in the Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company", and is constructing a refinery and 750km pipeline. 16 Therefore,
14 Henry Kenny, "China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia", Asia Pac!fic Review, volume 11,
number 2, 2004, p.41
15 Dr Emest Wilson, "China's influence in Africa - implications for US policy", testimony before the sub-
committee on Africa, human rights and international operations, VS House ~fRepresentatives, July 2004,
16 Henry Kenny, "China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia"
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Wilson notes, "the Chinese are adept at combining 'foreign aid' packages with commercial
and oil deals.,,17
Thus, when considering Japan's demand for oil, the relative recession that has plagued the
country's economy has meant only modest increases in oil demand, allowing China to
overtake it as the world's second largest importer of oil in 2003; yet Japan is still
overwhelmingly dependent on imported energy. In this regard, The Wall Street Journal
points out: "Tokyo did carve out a modest oil diplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s... by and
large, it followed American diplomacy - and enjoyed the assurance of US military muscle to
keep supplies lines open.,,18 However, as Tuman and Ayoub point out with regard to Japan's
Official Development Assistance in Africa between 1984 and 1998, "despite Japan's extreme
dependency on imported oil, aid policymakers did not seek to safeguard Japan's access by
rewarding African oil exporters with more Japanese ODA.,,19 Thus, questions regarding the
permanency of US umbrella military and political support, rising nationalism within Japan,
and stalling economic resurgence all bring the issue of energy resource security to the
forefront of Japan's foreign policy formulations.
It should also be noted, that the East Asian region still has a form of cold war hangover,
given a divided Korea, and Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands that were occupied by
Russia after World War 11, adding to the general levels of interstate tensions that permeate
the region. Consequently, there are a number of regional security issues that are emerging in
17 Dr Ernest Wilson, "China's influence in Africa - implications for US policy"
18 Wall street journal, "East is East", June 27 2005
19 Tuman & Ayoub, "The determinants of Japanese official development assistance in Africa: A pooled
time series analysis, International Interactions, volume 30, 2004
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light of the oil and gas competition between the two states, from Chinese territorial claims in
the South China Sea and the strategic importance of the straits of Malacca to issues of oil
reserves and the possible consequences across East Asia of another I970s-style oil shock.
Japan's overall view ofthe threatening nature of China's expansionist actions in the South
China Sea can be understood in terms ofthe geographic dependence the island nation has on
free trade routes. As Johnson points out, "through this waterway passes virtually all of the oil
from the Middle East for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.,,2o Thus the importance of
maintaining unrestricted trade routes can be understood as intimately linked with Japan's
national security when considering that the country is devoid of almost any natural resources
and, as a result, the massive industrial economy is almost entirely reliant on imported raw
materials and oil. In a broad description of the region's security environment, Christensen
notes,
The region is characterised by major shifts in the balance of power,
skewed distributions of economic and political power within and
between countries, political and cultural heterogeneity, growing but
still relatively low levels of intraregional economic interdependence,
anaemic security institutionalization, and widespread territorial
disputes that combine natural resource issues with postcolonial
nationalism.2I
Thus by following the threads of history, nationalism, and leadership, the complex web that
makes up the energy competition component of Sino-Japanese relations today can be
unravelled and the factors that underpin and ultimately motivate policy choices laid bare.
20 Chalmers Johnson, "Nationalism and the Market: China as a superpower", Japan Policy Research
Institute, JPRI Working Paper no. 22: July 1996.
http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp)7.htmI
21 Thomas Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia",
International Security, volume 23, number 4, 1999
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However, there are by no means a universally agreed upon set of outcomes when considering
either Sino-Japanese relations generally or the specific question of their competition for
future supplies of oil and gas. Indeed, as Jiang22 observes, there is no historical precedent for
two major power centres in East Asia; thus, how they will align into the future is largely
dependent on events that are happening now. Therefore, the growing Chinese influence in
the region is throwing up new power formulas, which are altering the regional status quo. As
a result, the delicate and intricate nature of Sino-Japanese relations into the future becomes
central to our understandings of global power alignments into the twenty first century.
22 Wenrang Jiang, "The Japanese Assessment of the "China Threat"', in Yee and Story (Eds), The China
Threat: Perceptions Myths and Reality, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 161
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Chapter One
The role ot histor,y and the development ot nationalistic impetus
In attempting to contextualise the complex nature of the historical relationship between Japan
and China, political analyst Yoichi Funabashi remarked that history "has become the leading
player on the East Asian political scene".23 Thus, a thorough understanding of the historical
background to the mutual animosities that characterise the alignment between the two states
today requires an examination of not only historical interactions but also the manner in which
history impacts on the development and direction of nationalism in the respective countries.
Central to the development of this form of national ism is the importance of historical
perspectives as a means of understanding the present and as a justification for future actions.
In writing about China, Jenner describes this phenomenon as the "tyranny of history." He
points out that history has an important cultural resonance in Asia as "perceptions and
thought patterns from the past bind living minds.,,24 In this way, he describes the manner in
which Chinese leadership, from the earliest Ming emperors to Mao, all relied on the words
13 Yoichi Funabashi, East Asia's history is creating mistrust, (8 March 2005),
http://www.asahi.com/columnlfunabashi/engffKY200501040130.html
24 W.J.F. Jenner, The tyranny ofHistory, London: Penguin, 1994, p. ]
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and wisdom ofthe past to guide their actions into the future. Therefore it is notable that in
the period when Chinese nationalism was beginning to take root following the collapse of the
last Manchu (Qing) dynasty, it coincided with the national humiliation that accompanied the
Japanese imperialist adventures in China. Thus, sixty years after the end of the Sino-
Japanese war, those forces that united a nation in opposition to an imperialist invader have
become embedded in the very fabric that composes the national sense of identity.
This sense of national identity that was formed around an understanding of opposition to the
Japanese occurred in the decades after the collapse of the weak and corrupt Manchu dynasty.
The weak state that Sun Yat-Sen finally united under a nationalist banner in 1928 was only
three years old when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. Thus the development of
Chinese nationalism can be seen at the time as the only response to the vastly superior
Japanese military machine that was eventually to control large swathes of the China. In
addressing the National Conference of the Communist Party in 1937, Mao said: "The aim of
our correct political policy and ofour solid unity is to win the masses in their millions for the
anti-Japanese national united front".25 However, this focus on national unity in the face of
the Japanese threat would be continued as theme of Party propaganda and national
educational policy under the communist party in China.
The history of China during the Twentieth Century and more specifically under communist
rule has followed what can only be described as waves of specialist technocratic policy
followed by waves of ideological fanaticism. This is particularly clear when you compare
25 Mao Tse-Tung, "Win the masses in their millions for the national United anti-Japanese front"(May 7
1937), Marxists.org, accessed 25 Jun. 05, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-I/mswvl 15.htm
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the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward with the sweeping economic reforms of
Deng Xiaoping. Thus in 2005, following the exponential economic growth that marked the
1980s and 1990s, the remnants of this form of nationalism - that is, the ideological
fanaticism - now defined in terms of uniting against a common enemy, can be found in the
policy decisions of Chinese leadership and the vociferous anti-Japanese riots that spread
across major cities throughout April 2005. Bearing in mind that spontaneous political
gathering or protest is not allowed under Chinese law and given the nature of state repression
of political dissent (which is well documented), it means that this type of protest had the
implicit approval or even instigation of the state. Thus, the instrumental nature of this
historical perspective and form of nationalism is still visible when considering the areas of
tension that mark Sino-Japanese relations in 2006.
Chairman Mao says in his famous 'little red book' of quotations, "things develop ceaselessly.
It is only forty-five years since the revolution of 1911, but the face of China has completely
changed. In another forty-five years, that is, in the year 2001, or the beginning of the 21 sI
century, China will have undergone an even greater change.,,26 The magnitudes of the
changes that have taken place in China are truly remarkable and, as the nation enters the
twenty first century its communist ideology appears to be found in name alone. Where once
the uniformed ideologues of the Cultural Revolution thronged Tiananmen Square in
adoration of Mao, today the only people found clutching the 'little red books' of Mao's
quotations are touts trying to sell them to the masses of foreign tourists that swarm in
Tiananmen Square. Mao's picture has looked down implacably from its position on the gate
26 Mao Tse-Tung, "In commemoration of Or. Sun Yat-Sen (1956), Quotationsfrom chairman Mao Tse-
Tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, p. 339
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of heavenly peace that overlooks Tiananmen Square presiding over immeasurable change. In
2006, such change has seen what was once the certainty of Chinese unity behind the banner
of communism crumble, and the new brand ofleaders in the Great Hall of The People in
Beijing are, in the words ofNewsweek magazine, "using nationalism as the glue that keeps
China together." However, they continue by noting "modern Chinese nationalism is defined
in large part by its hostility towards Japan.,,27 The manner of this historical feeling and
expression of nationalism finds its voice in the national anthem, which as Wilson notes "is
based on an anti-Japanese wartime song.',28
Consequently, despite the ideological transformation and ambiguity that characterises
modern China, Mao is still idolized because ofthe enduring perception that he united China
and fought the Japanese. While Chang and Halliday29 maintain that Mao in fact colluded
with the Japanese so as to improve his position with regard to Chiang Kai-shek and to
strengthen the position of the Chinese communists in a possible post-war alignment, the
version of history officially sanctioned and propagated by the Communist Party places Mao
as a central player in the defeat of the Japanese.
Thus, by understanding their history in terms of a weak disunited state open to the vultures of
imperialism versus a strong united state, concepts of Chinese national pride and state
sponsored nationalism can find a strong outlet of expression in a general distrust and dislike
of Japan. It seems that the nature of Japanese imperialism in China, imbued with what Eto
27 Liu, Caryl, Miller, Punoose, and Barry, HA New Kind of Challenge", Newsweek, no. 19, May 9 2005, p.
21
28 Dick Wilson, When Tigers Fight, the stOly ofthe Sino-Japanese war 1937-1945, New York: Viking
Press, 1982, p. 2
29 lung Chang & 10n Halliday, Mao - The Unknown Story, London: Vintage, 2006
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described as a "manifest destiny,,30 in Asia, has deeply scarred the national psyches of both
countries and, as such, continued to be apparent in 2006 through various mechanisms of
interstate interaction.
In his book' Inventing China Through History', Edward Wang notes this very process by
pointing out that "during World War 11, known as the Anti-Japanese War in China, Chinese
nationalism reached its high tide ... (and) many efforts were made to renew the linkage with
the past in order to demonstrate the insurmountable vitality of the Chinese nation.,,31 Yet,
while some authors such as Eastman described the war time relationship as "ambiguous,,32,
this study subscribes to the view held by many others which suggests that the nature of
Japanese imperialism and the historical feelings of injustice across Asia, and especially in
China, have genuine consequences for state interaction today. As Howe33 describes, Chinese
objectivity is rare when viewing Japanese actions. In this way, the convoluted and
intertwined strands of history, nationalism and the role of leadership can be seen as the
foundation of modem Sino-Japanese relations. Not surprisingly, the apparent reticence of
Japan to engage in greater levels of interaction in the region today despite its economic
30 Shinkichi Eto, "Evolving Sino Japanese Relations", in Katz and Friedman-Lichtschein (Eds), Japan's
New World Role, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 49
31 Edward Wang, Inventing China Through History, New York.: State University ofNew York Press, 200 I,
p. 8
32 L10yd Eastman, "Facets of an ambiguous relationship: smuggling, puppets and atrocities during the war
1937-1945"in Akira lriye (ed), The Chinese and the Japanese, essays in political and cultural interaction,
p. 275
33 Christopher Howe, "Introduction: The changing Political Economy of Sino-Japanese Relations: A Long
Term View"in Christopher Howe (Ed), China and Japan - History Trends and Prospects. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996, p.1
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dominance can be understood in terms of what Inoguchi describes as Japan's "tortuous
history,,34 in East Asia.
In terms of understanding the history of Japanese imperialism in China and why it continues
to elicit such a powerfully emotional and, resultantly, political response - especially when
considering that many Western nations also have imperial histories in China - many scholars
believe that it stems from the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894/5. Madeline Chi describes
Sino-Japanese relations in modem times as being notably "turbulent" and points to the war of
1894/5 as the beginning of the hostile nature of the relationship.35 Samuel Chu continues by
noting that before this time "Japan was never very important in the eyes of the Chinese,,36
and its modernisation - including military modernisation of the Meiji restoration, had gone
largely unnoticed in China, and would only become apparent in the West with the Japanese
defeat of Tsarist Russian forces in Manchuria in 1905. The consequences of this war on the
relationship between the two East Asian powers is described by Wang who notes that
China's defeat by Japan - as opposed to defeats to Western powers, "exerted a more
traumatic impact on the minds ofthe people because Japan's victory alarmed them about
their slow pace in adjusting themselves to the changing world." Significantly, Wang goes on
to note that "in coping with the crisis, Chinese historians pursued the writing of national
history in order to promote national pride.,,37
34 Takashi Inoguchi "Japan Goes Regional"in Takashi Inoguchi (Ed), Japan's Asian Policy - Revival and
Response, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 1
35 Madeline Chi, "Ts'ao Ju-Lin (1876- 1966): His Japanese Connections"in Akira lriye (ed),The Chinese
and the Japanese, essays in political and cultural interaction, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980,
p. 140
36 Samuel Chu, "China's attitude toward Japan at the time of the Sino-Japanese war"in Akira Iriye (ed), The
Chinese and the Japanese, essays in political and cultural interaction, p.77
37 Edward Wang, Inventing China Through HistOlJI, p.15
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The development of this understanding of history as intimately related to the development of
nationalism and how it relates to modern perceptions of Japanese actions can be understood
in terms of George Orwell's seminal essay on England when he noted that "up to a point, the
sense of national unity is a substitute for a 'world view'." 38 Consequently, the importance of
history and its impact on modern Chinese nationalism can be seen to form an integral part of
the norms of behaviour that formulate institutions in society. As Douglas North points out,
the nature of institutions in society can have far-reaching consequences for the efficiency of
economic exchange and future growth patterns.39 Thus, the extent to which historical
considerations constitute an element of Chinese institutions makes the understanding of the
complexities of the historical relationship between the two states vital to a greater
understanding of their relationship.
Beyond the war of 1894/5 in which China lost face and territory in the form of the Korean
peninsula and the island of Taiwan, it was the vicious war of 1937-1945 that casts the
greatest shadow over present Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese had already invaded and
set up a puppet regime in Manchuria in 1931 before the so called Marco Polo Bridge incident
sparked a full-scale war and the eventual Japanese control of most of Eastern China. With
the colonised Manchuria renamed Manchukuo and headed by the dethroned last emperor of
China Pu Yi, the Japanese-controlled puppet state was, as Behr notes, "Japan's Ruhr, fuelling
its war economy" 40 and providing a resource base for further expansion into China.
38 George Orwell, Inside the Whale and other essays, Harmondsworth Middlesex: Penguin, 1957, p. 75
39 Douglas North, "Institutions and Economic Growth: A historical Introduction", in Frieden and Lake,
International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, New York: Routledge, 2000
40 Edward Behr, The Last Emperor, London: Futura Publications, 1987, p.202
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When considering the 1937-1945 period, the one event that defined the war in the eyes of
many Chinese and that continues to colour relations to this day is the invasion and
occupation of Nanking (Nanjing) in December 1937. Referred to as the 'rape ofNanking'
the extent of atrocities committed by Japanese troops were as horrific as they were
widespread with approximately 200 000 civilian deaths and countless thousands of women
raped.4! Although the figure of200 000 casualties was placed on official record at the Tokyo
war crimes trial at the end of World War IJ, the real figure is believed by many to be
considerably higher. The full extent of the atrocities, undoubtedly, will never be known but
the immensity of the brutality and cruelty that was unleashed on the city continues to haunt
relations between China and Japan. As Wang points out, "China's complaints over Japan's
attitude to war history are more than just a symbolic gesture. They reflect the genuine
frustration and resentment among Chinese people." He then goes on to quote former Chinese
President Jiang Zemin as saying that "in modern history, among the major imperial powers,
China suffered most from Japan.,,42
The fallout from this incident continues to be felt through its influence on the development of
nationalistic tendencies in both countries. The manner in which this sorry chapter has been
dealt with in school textbooks is especially contentious in both countries with overlY self-
abusing views in Japan sparking a backlash from overtly right wing nationalist politicians
such as Shintaro Ishihara. While conversely, the Chinese feel that Japanese textbooks brush
over the atrocities and do not pay sufficient attention to the full extent of the horrors.
Ostensibly, it was the textbook issue that sparked the April 2005 protests. The apparent
41 Ibid, p.241
4~ Janwei Wang, "Confidence Building Measures and China-Japan relations", (accessed May 172005),
p.73, http://www.stimson.org/Japan/pdf/wang.pdf
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inability of Japan to atone adequately for the events in Nanking can be seen as integral to the
renewal of right wing nationalistic politics in that country. Ishihara, whose vocal criticism of
US policy in Japan and calls for a reassertion of Japanese sovereignty, claimed with regard to
Nanking: "the Chinese have exaggerated the numbers. In the hysteria of war, the army did
massacre people. That happens in war. The United States killed three hundred and fifty
thousand people in Hiroshima in a single day.,,43
However, despite the increased levels of nationalistic fervour that this incident has spawned
in China and Japan, the question of meaningful apology from Japan seems glaringly absent.
Wi Ison points out that instead of apology, Japanese leaders talk of 'regret', 'remorse' and
'contrition'. Though he continues by noting that "the Japanese feel guilt but do not know
how to express it without destroying themselves, their emperor (in whose name all these acts
were committed) and their imperial system.,,44 Following the outbursts of protest in China
during the first months of 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi again expressed "deep remorse" for
Japan's colonial aggression by saying that "Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a
spirit of humility.,,45
During Emperor Akihito's historic 1992 visit to China, the first ever by a Japanese Emperor,
he said: "there was a period in the past when my country inflicted untold hardships on the
people of China. This remains the source of my profound personal sorrow.',46 While viewed
43 Shintaro Ishihara, "On Ishihara's controversial position against China"(25 February 2005)
http://www.ezipangu.orglenglish/contents/news/naname/ishihara/ishihara2.htmI
44 Dick Wilson, China The Big Tiger -a nation awakes, London: Little Brown & Company, 1996, p. 419
45 "Japanese PM apologises over war", BBCNews.com, (22 April 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
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46 Kamiya Matake, "Japanese foreign policy towards northern Asia"in Takashi and Jain (Eds), Japanese
Foreign Policy Today, New York: Palgrave, 2000, p.235
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by some as a significant breakthrough in terms of moving beyond historically based
antagonism, the issue of apology appeared not to have been settled because according to
Wilson, when translated into Chinese this apology sounded "banal and attenuated.,,47 Thus
the issue of adequate apology still clouded the relationship and the latter years of the 1990s
saw the exacerbation ofdifficulties in managing the relationship coupled with growing fears
in Japan regarding Chinese intentions.
When considering the question of apology and the extent to which this issue still hangs over
Sino-Japanese relations, it should be examined and contextualised in terms of the Chinese
penal system under the communist party and the role of self-criticism and the acceptance of
one's 'wrong actions'. In fact, after Mao warned of the dangers inherent in being aware of
one's mistakes but making no attempt to correct them,48 vigorous self-criticism became a
hallmark of Party discipline. Those who found themselves in prison or who ran foul of the
fanatical teenage Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1976 were
expected to write lengthy self-criticisms, often daily, detailing the extent of their crimes.
Behr notes in his biography of the last Chinese Emperor Pu Vi, who spent nine years
undergoing re-education in prison under the communists that skilful self-criticism was key to
achieving redemption in Chinese communist society.49
Therefore, when considering that many of the so-called fourth generation of Chinese
leadership that includes President Hu Jintao - who are the only generation of leadership to
47 Dick Wilson, China The Big Tiger-a nation awakes, p. 420
48 Mao Tse-Tung, "Combat Liberalism"(l937), Quotationsfrom chairman Mao Tse-Tung, Peking: Foreign
Language Press, p. 465
49 Edward Behr, The Last Emperor, p. 300
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have not studied overseas, being too young to have studied in the Soviet Union and too old to
have travelled to the West - joined the party at the height of the cultural revolution, it is
reasonable to assume that these norms regarding the role of self-criticism are entrenched in
the modem leadership. Thus, the oblique and carefully worded expressions of remorse that
Japanese leaders offer fall far short of Chinese expectations of what constitutes an adequate
form of both admission of wrong-doing and apology.
Besides issues of apology and historical references to Nanking, Japanese war time activities
during this period continue to inflame public attention and elicit political repercussions
through a variety of actions. These include Chinese governmental attempts in 2005 to get the
location of the notorious germ warfare Unit 731 declared a UNESCO World Heritage siteSO,
and the rejection of compensation for the victims of germ warfare experiments by a Japanese
court of appeal.SI All of these factors combine to continue to keep the issues alive and
perpetuate the intensification of mutual animosity. The importance of historical perspective
and the nature of both Chinese and Japanese nationalisms combine with mutual perceptions
of threat to create their respective ideas of enemy images in East Asia.
With regard to the formation ofenemy image, and the extent to which it impacts upon the
geo-political tensions that characterise modern relations between Japan and China, it can be
understood in terms of Stein's analysis of enemy image. She points out that "once formed,
enemy images tend to become deeply rooted and resistant to change ... the images themselves
50 Li Frangchao, "Germ warfare site bids for world heritage status", China Daily (19 April 2005)
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then contribute autonomously to the perpetuation and to the intensification of the conflict." 52
In this way, the web ofcomplexities that characterise Sino-Japanese relations have built up
over time and moulded themselves through the workings of history, nationalism and
leadership to create and cement respective enemy images. Stein goes on to note that once
formed these images are difficult to dislodge and that "stability in enemy image is the default
and change is the exception.,,53
Thus in the context of East Asia, one can see this 'default distrust' permeating relations
despite the fact that today economic interactions are bringing the two states closer together.
The development and exacerbation of enemy image through the complex processes of
nationalism and security dilemma become especially pertinent when considering the nature
of China-Japan relations into the future. As such, the question of enemy image and its
relationship to modern geo-political tensions between the two states becomes significant
when considering, as Stein points out that "embedded enemy images and collective beliefs
are a serious obstacle to conflict management, routinization, reduction or resolution.,,54
Indeed, "what we see as a threat is a function in large part of the way we see the world and
who we think we are.,,55 Thus the development and direction of Chinese nationalism in the
last sixty years, built upon the historical understanding of Japanese hostility, has an
embedded enemy image of the Japanese as an integral element within its greater
52 Janice Gross Stein, "Image, Identity, and the Resolution ofYiolent Conflict", in Crocker, Hampson and
Aall, Turbulent Peace: The challenges ofManaging International Peace, Washington D.e.: United States
institute of Peace Press, 200 I, p.189
53 Ibid, p.196
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55 Ibid, p. 203
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understanding of national identity. However, this perception of threat is not uniquely
Chinese and can be seen as inherent within the modem Japanese understanding of national
identity too, especially in the post cold war era where the certainty of long term US umbrella
protection can not be taken for granted. Matake points out that as the difficulties managing
the relationship have intensified, so have Japanese fears about both the capabilities and
motives of China.56 In this way, the concept of enemy image operates at the theoretical level
of national consciousness, but with lasting and quite concrete results in terms of national
policy. Consequently, one can see the role of enemy image as a supplementary aspect of the
complex set of factors that make up the strands of history and nationalism within modem
Sino-Japanese relations.
Thus when considering in overview the full extent of history and its influence on nationalistic
direction and its ultimate impact on the future of China-Japan relations, Wilson notes that
"guilt is still part of the psychology of the relationship." He goes on to outline: "guilt dictates
the lack of symmetry in Sino-Japanese exchanges, allowing the Chinese to take the high
moral tone... helping them to twist more economic aid out of Japan.,,57 But this instrumental
use of historical injustice is having unforeseen consequences because, as Wilson again
describes, "all this is bait to the Japanese right wing and re-emerging nationalism, helping to
make it stronger than it otherwise would be.',58
56 Kamiya Matake, "Japanese foreign policy towards northern Asia"in Takashi and Jain (Eds), Japanese
Foreign Policy Today, p. 235
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Fonner Japanese foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura recently noted that the present
difficulty with regard to historical perception between the two countries "is not a problem
that will be resolved easily." However he also dismissed the idea that China is habitually
using the 'history card' as a diplomatic tool.59 Either way, the fact remains that the role of
history and perceptions thereof, coupled with rising nationalist sentiments in both countries,
will continue to underpin and colour Sino-Japanese relations for some time. Added to this is
the perception by both countries that diplomacy in the region is a zero-sum game, an
understanding that seems intimately linked with the role of historical perspective in the
fonnulation of both policy and mutual understanding of their respective motives.
When considering Japan's post war history, it is notable not only for its meteoric economic
growth in the last half of the twentieth century but also for its remarkably conservative and
risk-adverse diplomatic policies. This reluctance to exert greater diplomatic influence is in
large part because of the nature and perception of Japan's history in the region. As Pyle notes,
Japan is "compelled by the burdens of history to move cautiously in shaping a post-cold war
political strategy for Asia".6o Thus we can go so far as to say that regionally held perceptions
of history impinge on Japan's soft power capabilities and have manifested themselves quite
tangibly in Japanese policy decisions. For instance, any attempt by Japan to criticise
Beijing's human rights record is met with a response that details Japanese abuses during the
1937-1945 war, and the state controlled media in China allows for a uniformity of response
and can also be seen to perpetuate public perceptions that are desired by the government.
59 Tom Plate, "Japan apologetic: prisoner of the past?", Japan Times, (March 29 2005)
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However, many analysts are seeing changes within Japan, with a greater assertion of
nationalism, and moves such as Japan's concerted lobbying for a permanent seat at the
United Nations Security Council are all designed to improve Japan's position on the world
stage. This desire to become a genuine world power comparable with its economic might
seems to be embodied in Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi whose repeated visits
to the controversial Yasukuni shrine despite vociferous protests across Asia, and pushing
through special legislation so as to send Japanese troops to Iraq (in spite of constitutional
restraint) point to this desire to create a more assertive Japan. Added to this, Kazuaki argues
that China's trump card of history is a wasting asset because "as the generation of Japanese
with memories of Japan's militaristic past gives way to a younger generation with a weaker
sense of historical guilt, China may not be able to continue the stratagem.,,61
Thus, the threads of history, nationalism and the role of leadership have built upon each other
to lay the foundation of modem Sino-Japanese relations and constitute the key aspects that
characterise the tensions between the two states today. In this way, the nature of the
relationship between the two great powers of East Asia will greatly determine their ability to
grow and their mutual desires to exercise power in the region. At the end of the cold war.
both Japan and China found themselves in very different positions economically and in terms
oftheir political and international standing. On opposite ends of the cold war divide, the two
nations find themselves in 2006 with markedly different politico-economic structures. As
such, the manner in which their mutual historical mistrusts, antagonistic nationalisms, or
different paths of political and economic development will impact their relationship into the
(,) Kotake Kazuaki, quoted in: Dick Wilson, China The Big Tiger-a nation awakes, p.420
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future is difficult to determine. But without an understanding of the importance of history
and its effects on the development of nationalism in both countries, an understanding and
examination of the areas of conflict that mark China-Japan interactions today would not be
possible.
Yasukuni shrine and Japanese war guilt
Although this study has addressed the question of historical perspective and the
consequences of the history between these two states, the issue of the Yasukuni shrine
continues to have significant political influence and impact that are intimately linked to both
the historical and modem understandings of its consequences. The Shinto shrine in Tokyo is
dedicated to the souls of about 2.5 million Japanese who have died in the name of their
country; however, at the centre of the shrine's controversy is the fact that those venerated
include 14 convicted class A war criminals.62 The class A categorisation relates to those
military leaders and civilian politicians sentenced at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal
following the end of WWII for war crimes such as waging aggressive war in contravention of
international law, the mistreatment of prisoners-of-war and for the various atrocities
committed during the Japanese capture of Nanking. Included among those enshrined at
Yasukuni is General Hideki Tojo, who was minister of war between 1940 and 1944 and is
considered by many people in Asia as the arch-criminal of the Pacific War. Thus, visits to
the shrine by sitting Japanese Prime Ministers invariably lead to considerable condemnation
62 BBC News, Japan's controversial shrine http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pf/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/1330223.stm
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across Asia and raise questions domestically with regard to the separation of state and
religion. Consequently, following a Tokyo court ruling that visiting Yasukuni as Prime
Minister contravenes Japanese law with regard to the separation of state and religion,
Koizumi visits in his private capacity - yet this does little to quell the condemnation from
South Korea and China.
As Reischauer and Jansen point out, the leaders of the Meiji restoration attempted to create a
Shinto-centred system of government, but when they realised its inconsistencies with the
western political model they were following, they created a system of state support for Shinto
shrines and built the Yasukuni shrine to honour the military men who had died in defence of
the country. 'State Shinto' was then "officially defined by the government as being not a
religion but a manifestation of patriotism.,,63 The peak of 'state Shintoism' was reached in
the militaristic and nationalistic frenzy that characterised the pre-war years, and resultantly
was severely restrained during the occupation years when the American forces demanded a
clear separation between state and religion and saw many of its practices as encouraging
xenophobia and militarism. Thus, with the enshrinement ofexecuted war criminals there in
1978 and the subsequent visits by several sitting Prime Ministers, the shrine has become
remarkably controversial both domestically and in the region. Domestic opposition comes
largely from Christians and other religious groups as well as the political left keen to distance
Japan from its past, while China and South Korea often lead the vocal protests that Japan is
not renouncing its militaristic past. However, apart from the international outcry, Reischauer
63 Edwin Reischauer and Marius Joosen, The Japanese Today change and continuity, Cambridge
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996, p.209
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and Jansen also note that, "on the whole the Yasukuni shrine is regarded as analogous to the
tomb of the unknown soldier.,,64
In many ways the post-war years in Japan has seen not just a concerted movement away from
nationalism but also its actual repudiation by national policy. As part of this outlook, both
the national flag and anthem were shunned and the peace constitution was crafted to ensure a
lack of offensive military capabilities. With this came reluctance by many Japanese to visit or
acknowledge sites ostensibly linked with their much-maligned imperial history, and this was
visible in the limited diplomatic role that the country assumed on the international stage.
Thus, the Yasukuni shrine has come to be seen as a key indicator of national mood and,
resultantly, as an indicator ofdiplomatic intentions. The importance ofYasukuni throughout
the 1990s and, especially, under the Koizumi leadership can be traced as an important factor
in the re-emergence of Japanese nationalism. Although this emergent nationalism takes a
significantly different form to that of pre-war Japan, it is intimately linked with official
attempts to acknowledge and appreciate certain cultural aspects while coming to terms with
the past.
The role of the Yasukuni shrine, and by implication the role of history, as a determinant of
Japanese diplomatic behaviour and intent can be understood in terms of war guilt being the
shaping feature of Japan's diplomatic moves in the region. However, as Green notes, "in
Japan there is increasing apology fatigue. A new generation of Japanese leaders no longer
instinctively understand why China has the right to obstruct Japan's aspirations for influence.
While they recognise still the necessity of dealing with the past, they are resentful of what
64 Ibid, polIO
30
they see as cynical Chinese manipulation of the history card in bilateral negotiations over
issues unrelated to history.,,65 In this way, Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni
shrine every year since he took office in 2001 can be seen as an indication of a desire to re-
establish Japan's position as a leading diplomatic nation comparable with its economic
influence.
However in the context of Sino-Japanese relations, Yasukuni and historical perceptions in
general continue to cloud interactions between the two states. Indeed, as Wang points out,
"the understanding of history, therefore, remains a main psychological obstacle in China-
Japan confidence building, not just in political domain, but also in security and military.,,66
Thus, to what extent Prime Ministerial visits to the shrine actually influence diplomatic
relations beyond considerable rhetoric is highly contested. Writing in the Japan Times,
Nabeshima has argued that by continually visiting the shrine "Prime Minister Koizumi could
seriously harm Japan's national interests." Nabeshima insists that "his persistence in visiting
the Tokyo memorial to the nation's war dead has intensified the firestorm of anti-Japan
criticism in China and South Korea, undermining the Japanese position in Asian
diplomacy.,,67 Nojima writes in the Asahi Shimbun that the Yasukuni issue is affecting the
65 Michael Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism - foreign policy challenges in an era o.funcertain power,
New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.94
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succession race within the LDP because of the perception that those who visit the shrine will
not be able to foster relations with Beijing.68 While conversely, Wang argues that:
China's seemingly endless grievances on the issue of history always
sound louder than they really are. While both sides could be quite
emotional and vocal, in practical policy Chinese and Japanese rarely
let the animosity over history to carry the day. Behind China's
obsession with Japan's historical guilt, it is not difficult to find more
utilitarian motivation such as squeezing more economic concessions
from Japan.69
Consequently, despite the fact that former Prime Minister Nakasone who visited the shrine in
1985 and then refrained from doing so again following Chinese complaints has joined eight
other former Prime Ministers in advising Koizumi to stop visiting Yasukuni, Koizumi has
given no intention that he intends to stop visiting in his private capacity - but not as a
representative of government. Clearly this is an indication of Koizumi's resolve to reinstate
Japan as an un-constrained member of the international community and to move away from
the Japanese diplomatic staple of war guilt.
Koizumi's actions in terms of visiting the shrine and pushing for both domestic constitutional
reform and a Japanese seat on the Security Council, combined with Chinese reluctance to
budge over the Yasukuni issue can be seen as important factors in the formulation of modem
Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a meeting with
Koizumi in May 2005 and flew home the same day apparently in response to remarks made
by LDP Secretary General Takebe that Chinese opposition to Yasukuni visits amounted to
68 Tsuyoshi Nojima, "Yasukuni casts shadow - even over those jockeying to succeed Koizumi", The Asahi
Shimbun, (28 May 2005), hnp://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200505280147.html
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interference in domestic affairs.7o Again, in May 2006, at the first meeting between the
respective foreign ministers in over a year, the Yasukuni issue continued to overshadow a
number of other pressing areas of dispute including rival claims to oil and gas reserves in the
East China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told Japanese Foreign Minister Taro
Aso that Koizumi's visits to the shrine "has also become a political drawback. I want
Japanese leaders to pay due consideration to the people in countries that suffered from
wartime damage.,,71
The high-level dialogue that this issue continues to generate indicates that the Yasukuni
shrine and history in general are still key determinants of diplomatic interaction in East Asia
and shape a foundation of perception and interpretation of each other's actions. [n this way,
the Koizumi government has spearheaded Japan's desire to re-establish a regional position
that is commensurate with its economic size. Nevertheless, the re-emergence of Japanese
nationalism must be understood in the context of a number of critical factors: the rapid
growth and emergence of a more assertive China; the reality of a growing sense ofJapanese
vulnerability without the cold war certainty of US umbrella protection; and the present
climate of hostility over energy-resource competition. Given this context, an exacerbation of
the already tense relations can create the potential for either an open conflict or a highly
divisive and destabilising regional competition in East Asia.
70 The Asahi Shimbun, "Japan China lock horns over Yasukuni, Wu visit", (25 May 2005),
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Territorial disputes and the 9uestion ot oil and gas in the Last
China Sea
Napoleon Bonaparte is credited with saying, "when China wakes, it will shake the world"n,
a sentiment that is as true in 2006 as it ever was, and a sentiment that underlies Japanese
fears with regards to its giant neighbour. The nature of historical perspective that continues
to permeate Sino-Japanese relations in 2006 provides a backdrop of mistrust and continues to
be a factor in East Asian interstate tensions. Present China-Japan relations are characterised
by the ambiguity of increasing economic interaction and interdependence coupled with
increasing academic and cultural exchanges through tourism and the fact that more Chinese
students study abroad in Japan than anywhere else.73 Yet, their historically-based mistrust
and political animus have found numerous outlets resulting in a wide range of disputes.
72 Kristof & Wu Dunn, China Wakes. The struggle/or the soul ~ra rising power, London: Nicholas
Brealey Publishing, 1994, p. 387
73 Chalmers Johnson "No Longer the Lone Superpower": coming to terms with China', Japan Policy
Research Institute, working paper no. 105 (March 2005), http://www.jpri.org.publications/working
papers/wp I05.hlml p. 7
34
Thus, when examining the nature of energy-driven animus in East Asia, there are two critical
geopolitical zones of direct Sino-Japanese competition - namely, the East China Sea and the
South China Sea. This chapter seeks to detail the nature of territorial dispute that is
occurring in the East China Sea against the backdrop of China's growing demand for energy
resources. The dynamics of East Asia's politico-economic relations are undoubtedly being
affected by the rapid growth of China. As Hilton points out, "China's rise is shifting the
geopolitical tectonic plates, offering a direct challenge to Japan's economic dominance of
East Asia and to the strategic dominance the US has enjoyed, with its major ally Japan since
1945.,,74 The economic growth in China, its increases in military expenditure and
exponential growth in demand for energy sources can be seen in realist terms as the basis
around which Japanese security dilemma is occurring. When combined with the various
diplomatic and territorial disputes between the two states, the gravitation towards a
worsening of already poor historical relations over the issue of oil can be envisaged.
Beyond the areas of convergence and economic interdependence that can be found in the
East Asian region, there lie several simmering disputes and areas of threat - perceived or
otherwise - that continue to characterise contemporary China-Japan relations. For instance,
territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the resultant economic and strategic
gains from control of the large ocean areas that fall under their Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) as well as fears of Chinese irredentism and expansionism in the South China Sea are
key factors underlying Japanese fears of Chinese capabilities and motives in the region.
These perceptions have been compounded not only by increases in Chinese military
74 Isabel Hilton, "When the safety valve blows", The Guardian, (April 152005),
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expenditure and the unresolved issue of Taiwan, but also the continued Chinese demands for
adequate Japanese apology and denouncement of its imperialist past, including the demand
that sitting Japanese Prime Ministers refrain from visiting the Yasukuni shrine.
Also, economic interactions have resulted in areas of dispute between the two states with
Japan joining many World Trade Organisation (WTO) countries in requesting China to float
its currency, believing it to be maintained artificially low thereby unfairly benefiting Chinese
exporters. Tension has also arisen because of the Japanese decision to cut its Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to China, funds that the Chinese have always claimed were
in fact war reparations payments. Added to these, are attempts by Japan to gain a permanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council, a move vehemently opposed by the Chinese
who fear a militarised and emboldened Japan. As such, China welcomes the continued
presence of American forces in Japan. Ironically, both sides often perceive the presence of
US forces as a stabilising factor and a key constraint on aggression by the other.
However, when viewing present Sino-Japanese relations in a general sense, the overriding
factors which can be determined to be driving a wedge between the two countries are issues
of security and access to energy resources. As Bajpaee has noted, "China's quest for energy
resources on the world stage is creating a destabilising effect on international and regional
security.,,75 He continues by pointing out that despite the unprecedented levels of trade
between the two countries in the three years since 2002, "economic progress could be
75 Chietigji Bajpaee, "Setting the stage for a new cold war: china's quest for energy security", The Power
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The 1973 oil shock and the Japanese response
Oil supply and oil security continue to be of concern for all the states in East Asia, where oil
remains the dominant fuel across the region - comprising 40 percent of total primary energy
consumption. 77 Further, by 20 I0 the International Association ofenergy Economists predicts
that East Asia (without China) will import 100 percent of their oil supplies78 thus making the
economic and security repercussions of an oil shock considerable. In attempting to offset
these risks, Japan maintains emergency oil stocks of 315 million barrels - the world's third
highest stock behind the United States and Europe, which maintain reserves of 563 and 325
million barrels respectively.79 These reserves are intended to mitigate losses in Gross
Domestic Product or to maintain the country's armed forces in the case of war and constitute
approximately 160 days' supply of oil.8o Yet in the case of Japan, the economic costs of the
1973 oil shock continue to influence policy formation in the context of modern energy
competition in East Asia and the perceived threat of Chinese expansion in this regard.
An examination of Japan's response to the 1973 oil crisis provides a telling indication of how
oil concerns impacted on Japanese foreign policy and provides a useful base for
understanding the respective Sino-Japanese responses to present energy concerns. As Yorke
describes, following the decision by the Arab member of OPEC to cut production by 25
percent and classify Japan as an 'unfriendly state' in 1973, the country engaged in a damage
77 Paik, Leiby, Jones, Yokobori &Bowman, "Strategic Oil stocks in the APEC region", IAEE 22"J Annual
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limitation program through the formulation of bilateral relations with oil at their core. Yorke
notes, "Tokyo was thrown into a state of panic. In order to restore interrupted supplies,
Japan proceeded to abandon the principle on which its postwar external relations had been
based - the separation of economic and political matters.,,81
Thus, energy concerns had been pushed to the forefront of Japanese foreign policy
formulation and led to the first break with American foreign policy when Japan called for
Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967 and reiterated Japan's support
concerning the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and hinted at a reconsideration of its
policy towards Israel. Yorke referred to this process as Japan's departure into 'resource
diplomacy,.82 The events of 1973 highlighted not only Japan's severe dependence on
imported oil - made worse by the fact that at that time Japan had no emergency oil stockpiles,
but also stressed the need to diversify its sources of supply. The 1973 oil crisis, and to a
slightly lesser extent, the oil disruptions following the Iranian revolution in 1979, highlighted
the extent to which energy concerns had become the central issue in terms of Japan's foreign
policy in the Middle East - resulting in bilateral diplomacy with the oil producing states,
centred around investment aid and trade.83
In describing the Japanese response to the oil crisis, Smart notes, "Japan and some members
of the European Community ... escaped the full potential force of the 'oil weapon', by
making placatory statements and gestures and, to a lesser extent, by scrambling with more
81 Valerie Yorke, "Oil, the Middle East and Japan's search for security", International A.ffairs, volume 57,




alacrity than dignity for available supplies.,,84 However, the economic consequences of oil
shortages can be severe, and the economic decline that Japan experienced following the oil
shock and resulting world recession are telling when considering the nature of that double-
digit growth that China is experiencing in 2006, and the impact of energy resources in
maintaining high growth rates.
Throughout the I960s, Japan experienced double-digit growth yet between 1974 and 1978
the Japanese economy grew at only 3.7 percent,85 thereby demonstrating the continued
economic damage caused by the oil disruptions and increased price of oil. As Eguchi points
out, there has always been a very close link in the Japanese economy between energy
consumption and the growth rate, as well as a link between growth and the price ofoil.86
Basically, higher energy prices compel the government to pursue restrained monetary and
fiscal policies so as to avoid the inflationary pressures associated with higher oil prices. Thus,
the economic costs of the 1973 oil shock were clearly visible to Japanese policy-makers and
the need to maintain energy security continues to be an integral part of foreign policy
formulation.
The 1973 oil crisis had considerable repercussions in Japan, both in terms of the economic
costs of reduced growth and in terms of the diplomatic response to the threat to energy
supplies. Thus, when considering the nature of energy resource competition in East Asia in
2006, the issue of access to diverse and secure sources of oil and gas are central to the
84 lan Smart, "Oil, the superpowers and the Middle East", International Affairs, volume 53, number I, 1977,
Ps' ~:jiro Eguchi, "Japanese energy policy", International Affairs, Volume 56, number 2, 1980, p. 265
86 1bid
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diplomatic efforts of both China and Japan to diversify and secure their energy supplies. As
Japanese vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Seishiro Eto has noted, "given our current
dependence on oil and coal for energy, and our reliance on the Middle East for oil, it is
important that we continue to diversify our sources of energy and energy supplies.,,87 While
the increasing demand for energy resources in China is pushing oil to the forefront of
Chinese diplomatic ties with Russia, the Middle East and Africa these efforts, however, are
focused against an environment of escalating world oil prices, driven primarily by Chinese
demand, and deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations linked to questions of energy security and
built on the considerable foundation of historical mistrust.
Increasing Chinese demand tor oil and gas
Central to the issue of Sino-Japanese competition for oil and gas reserves is the exponential
growth in Chinese demand and the global repercussions of these increases, as well as the
impact on the historically fragile relationship with Japan. The significance of reliable access
to oil is highlighted by Shelley who notes that "the source and availability ofenergy
determine industrial development, means of transportation and subsistence." He goes on to
point out that the global dependence on oil and gas "has fundamentally changed social
relations within and between regions of the world.,,88 While this study will focus on the
effects of Chinese demand for oil and gas specifically within the context of East Asia and
ergy Security and Japan's foreign policy", opening address by vice-minister for
n energy security in Asia, available at:
,olicy/energy/addressO I03.html
.itics, poverty & the planet, Claremont: David Phillip, 2005, p. I
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greater Sino-Japanese relations, it is important to note the global perspective in which
Chinese energy growth is occurring. In terms of energy consumption, Bustelo notcs that
China's "energy consumption has increased very sharply in recent years: between 2000 and
2004, consumption rose from 766 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) to 1,386 Mtoe (rising
from 8.4% to 13.6% of world consumption), annual growth in energy consumption averaged
16% from 2000 to 2004 -a period during which China was responsible for 54.2% of the
. . Id . ,,89Increase In wor energy consumptIOn.
In examining the impact of increasing Chinese demand on perception and policy formulation
in the United States, Shelley describes China as "once inconsequential to oil politics, it is on
the cusp of demonisation in the US as its role in world oil markets growS.,,90 In justifying this
statement, Shelley quotes the testimony of former assistant secretary ofdefence Frank
Gaffney to the House of Representatives on the implications of Chinese demand for oil:
If the Chinese economy achieves per capita energy
consumption levels comparable to those of Japan ...China
alone would require some 70 percent of the world's current
oil production. Should, on the other hand, the Chinese reach
contemporary American consumption levels ... the People's
Republic alone would require more than the entire global
production of oil. This is obviously a formula for conflict
with China, and, indeed, it is not surprising that the Chinese
say, primarily for internal consumption, to be sure, that a
conflict with the United States is inevitable, and I think they
. fi h 91are prepanng or t at.
Beyond US perceptions that the significant increases in Chinese demand for oil are
ultimately threatening, a major portion of the increases in world oil prices between 2002 and
89 Pablo Bustelo, "China and the geopolitics ofoil in the Asia Pacific region", working paper 38, Real
lnstituto Elcano de esrudios internacionales y estrategicos. September 2005
90 Ibid, p. 84
91 Frank Gaffuey, quoted in Toby Shelley, Oil politics, poverty & the planet, p. ] ]5
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2006 can be attributed to rising demand for oil in China. At the time of writing (November
2006), the market price for Brent crude oil was in the region of US$ 57 a barrel (having come
down from more than $70pb in mid 2006), driven up by a number of supply-side concerns in
Nigeria and tension over Iran's nuclear ambitions - however, the overriding factor pushing
world oil prices ever higher continues to be driven by Chinese demand.
Figure 2.1
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As the figure 2.1 indicates, the period from 2002 to 2005 saw a marked increase in oil prices
- a trend which continued into 2006, with the oil price breaking beyond US$ 70 a barrel.
92 WTRG Economics, "Crude oil production I990-2005",(accessed 27 March 2006),
http://www.wtrg.comprices.html
43
However, a significant aspect of the increasing trend in the oil price after 2002 is that it
coincided with increases in oil production. This apparent anomaly is explained by the overall
and substantial increases in Chinese demand for oil to fuel the exponential growth of its
economy.
Thus in effect, Chinese demand is such that it is altering the efficacy of supply-side measures
that the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has relied upon to
manipulate world oil prices since the 1970s. Kaufmann notes that despite the increases in
crude oil production of 1.2 million barrels a day (MBD) during the first half of 2005 by
OPEC countries, and an increase of 0.9 MBD by non-OPEC countries, "oil prices during the
first half of2005 were nearly $20 per barrel higher than the same period last year".
Kaufmann continues by pointing out that "this dramatic price increase, despite increases in
OPEC production, has led many including OPEC, to conclude that OPEC has lost control of
oil prices, especially on the downside.,,93 This is all the more remarkable when considering
that until the mid I990s, China was a net oil exporter94 and has only grown into the world's
second largest importer of crude oil (after the United States) in the decade since it became a
net importer.
Since 2000, Chinese oil demand has grown from about four million barrels a day to six and a
half million in 2005. Consequently, Chinese oil imports have swelled from a million barrels
a day to about three and a half in 2005. Perhaps, the most telling statistic ofall is that the net
93 Robert Kaufinann, "The forecast for world oil markets", Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies',
(accessed 14 Feb 2006), http://www.oilanalysis.org/prices/link oil report 9 O?pdf
94 "The great oil hunt", Business Week, (15 Nov 2004), issue 3908
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increase in Chinese oil imports for the first five months of2004 grew by 46 percent.95 In
meeting the needs of its fast-growing economy, Chinese oil consumption grows by seven and
a half percent per year - seven times faster than the United States, with an estimated 90
percent more vehicles on the road in China in 20 I0 than there were in 1990.96
Figure 2.2
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95 Robert Kaufinann, "The forecast for world oil markets", Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies,
(accessed 14 Feb 2006), http://www.oilanalysis.org/prices/link oil report 9 02.pdf
96 Gal Luft, "Fuelling the Dragon: China's race into the oil market", Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security http://www.iags.org/china.htm
97 Pablo Bustelo, "China and the geopolitics of oil in the Asia Pacific region", working paper 38, Real
institl/to Elcano de estl/dios internacionales y estrategicos, September 2005
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According to Berger, the forecasts for oil consumption in China in the period 2000 to 2020
will grow between 100 and 160 percent. However as Berger also points Ollt, "due to the
limited resources available, its (domestic) production will not increase substantially ... this
will increase China's dependence on imported oil to 55 percent (or according to the
maximum scenario, to 76.9 percent). This corresponds approximately to the current level of
the United States' foreign dependency (58 percent).',98 Therefore, as Bo Lin, an energy
specialist at the Asia development bank has claimed, "More than a billion Chinese are
joining the oil market. How can prices go down?,,99
Thus, the prevailing trend of increasing world oil prices can be viewed generally as a direct
result of increasing Chinese demand over and above more transitory factors that might cause
a 'spike' in world oil prices. This increasing trend saw China overtake Japan as the second
largest importer ofoil in 2003. As Kenny describes, "The supply for this growing demand
cannot be found domestically. Proven Chinese oil reserves are in decline, and constitute only
2.1 percent ofglobal reserves. Gas reserves are in even shorter supply, constituting only 1
percent of global reserves.,,100 As a result, Chinese policy makers are forced to look to
international sources for the vital oil and gas supplies central to that country's economic
growth. A significant aspect of this search is the exploration of the Chunxiao gas field in the
disputed area near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. As Kenny points out, the dispute not only
raises questions with regard to Chinese maritime claims but also it "highlights the ongoing
98 Yakov Berger, "China's energy strategy", Far Eastern Affairs, volume 32, number 3, July-Sept
99 80 Lin, quoted in Matthew Fomey, "China's quest for oil", TIME, (25 Oct 2004),
http://www.time.comitime/asia/magazine/article/0.13673.501041025-725174.00.html
100 Henry Kenny, "China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia", Asia Pacific Review, volume 11,
number 2, 2004, p. 38
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Chinese search for oil and gas wherever it can be found - this despite the fact that East China
Sea exploration has thus far failed to produce a large new energy supply."lol
Figure 2.3
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The global and regional significance ofthe emergence of China as a major player on the
102
international oil market is linked with China's relatively recent emergence as a large-scale oil
101 Ibid, p. 40
101 Pablo Bustelo, "China and the geopolitics of oil in the Asia Pacific region", working paper 38, Real
lnstituto Eh'ano de estudios internacionales y estrategicos, September 2005
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purchaser. The discovery of oil at Daqing in 1959 meant that the country was able to
produce more crude than it required for decades, a fact which the govemment celebrated as a
political victory. As Fomey describes, during the Cultural Revolution the country's best
known worker was Wang Jinxi who was said to have plunged into a vat of Daqing oil during
freezing winter and stirred it with his body so it would continue flowing - leading legions of
Red Guards to chant "study Daqing!,,103
Further discoveries of oil and gas in the South China Sea and Bohai Gulf, where drilling
began in 1979 104 made the country appear impervious to oil shocks and remained an oil
exporter well into the 1990s. However, as the output from China's top four oil fields is in
decline - including the oil reserves in the Tarim basin which are considered uneconomical to
drill even with oil prices above $50 a barrel 105 - and the rapid economic growth sparked by
Deng's economic liberalisation requiring increasing amounts of fuel to feed the economy,
China is forced to hunt for greater overseas supplies for oil and gas. And at the forefront of
China's greater efforts to secure energy resources from abroad is the state-owned China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), which is responsible not only for securing oil
supplies from not only the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, but also is central in the
Chinese attempts to drill in the contested waters of the East and South China Seas.
Figure 2.4 illustrates China's domestic oil fields as well as the offshore fields in the East and
South China Sea. It is these areas ofoffshore oil and gas exploration which have significant





consequences for Sino-Japanese relations and general security implications for the region, as
both countries scramble to secure access to these recently discovered oil and gas reserves.
Figure 2.4
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The Financial Times compares the accelerated quest for energy security in Asia over the past
two years to the panic displayed by some governments in the I970s following the oil
crisis. I07 In this light, the seriousness with which governments across the region - beyond
China and Japan - are taking the issue of energy security makes the significance of these
regional confrontations over access to the oil fields considerable.
Senkaku/Diaotju Territorial dispute
Beyond the history of animosity and its effects on the development of nationalism that
continue to colour China-Japan relations, there are a number of more realist issues that
impact on the security dilemma of both states including issues of military expenditure and
expansion, as well as territorial claims, focused against the backdrop of the increasingly
competitive question of access to energy sources. Wh ile Ch ina has often vocal ised its fears
of Japanese remilitarisation and the fear that economic wealth could be turned into military
might, this study will focus more on Japanese fears regarding perceptions of Chinese
expansionism and the dangerous nexus of irredentism and China's access to vital regional
sources of oil and gas that seem to be integral elements of the Japanese perceptions of China
as a threat. As Hutchings points out, Chinese territorial claims to large areas of the South
China Sea, notably the Spratly islands, have "done more than any other single issue to raise
107 Financial Times, "scramble for oil: Asia's quest for energy security is understandable, yet hard", (10 Jan
2005)
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fears about Chinese expansionism in East and South East Asia."J08 But the territorial claim
that is most immediately concerning to Japan is the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute. Named
Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Mandarin respectively, the islands are found on the end
reaches of the chain of tiny islands that make up the Ryukyu Islands. Both countries claim
the islands and as Dzurek notes, the dispute "involves 500-year-old claims and future
offshore oil development. Sovereignty over the islets could affect 40,000 sq km of
surrounding continental shelf." 109 Indeed, ultra nationalist groups from both countries






However, when formulating an understanding of the competing rights ofaccess to the gas
fields that surround the disputed islands, both the Japanese and Chinese governments couch
their arguments in terms of the position of the islands with respect to their Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ). The United Nations Law of the Sea affords the coastal state
1080. Hutchings, Modern China, A guide to a century ofchange, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2001, p. 391
109 D. Dzurek, "The SenkakuIDiaoyu Islands Dispute",(accessed I October 2004),
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&g=senkaku+conflict.htm
110 "Asian giants keep up war of words", BBC News, (15 April 2005), http://news.bbc.co.ukf?/hi/asia-
pacificl4443307.stl11
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"sovereign rights for the purpose ofexploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
natural resources."111 However, when two countries claim the land that forms the basis for
this right or the distance between the two countries is such that their claimed EEZ areas
overlap, then the issue becomes considerably more complicated. Both scenarios reflect the
current situation between China and Japan.
As Fedorova explains, the origins of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the islands can be traced
to a 1968 UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East report "that suggested the
existence of one of the world's largest oil fields on the East China Sea's continental shelf
close to the Senkaku islands." 112 These uninhabited islets, while actually un mentioned in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty fell within the area demarcated by the US military as including
the Ryukyu archipelago which was administered by US forces until 1952, and officially
returned to Japan along with Okinawa in 1972. However as Fedorova points out, "neither
Taiwan, nor China, or any other states raised official protest against whatever the US Ryukyu
administration or Japan was doing on the Senkaku islands up until 1970.',113
The period from 1970 onwards saw increasing claims on the islands by both Taiwan and
China motivated by both fishing rights and the apparent existence of oil which, however, was
not extractable at that time due to its depth within the seabed and a lack of effective drilling
technology suitable to the conditions. However, it was only in the mid-1990s that the islands
became a factor in the worsening of Sino-Japanese relations. Fedorova explains that Chinese
I1I United Nations Law of the Sea, Part V, article 56,
http://www.un.orgldepts/los/conventionagreements/texts/unclos/c1osindex.htm
112 Maria Fedorova, "The roots of Sino-Japanese differences over the Senkaku (diaoyudao) islands", Far
Eastern Affairs, volume 33, issue I, 2005, p. 113
113 1bid, p.114
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military exercises in March 1996 intended to intimidate Taiwan caused serious apprehension
in Japan, where it was felt that should China seize Taiwan by force they would attempt to
grab the Senkaku islands as well-leading to the eruption of hostilities between the two
states. Fedorova continues by noting that the "territorial dispute was further aggravated by
the fact that while subscribing to the UN convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996, both
China and Japan included the Senkaku islands in their marine economic zones." 114 It should
be noted that Taiwan also claims the islands however, due to the disputed nature of its own
legal existence as a sovereign state the predominant voices on the issue tend to be from the
People's Republic of China and Japan.
Thus, the present Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is clearly centred
on exploration of the Chunxiao oil field known to the Japanese as Shirakaba. Chinese gas
exploration projects have caused the Japanese government to lodge an official protest against
what it characterised as a violation of the boundaries of the Japanese economic zone I 15. As
the Swedish Defence Research Agency points out in a report on the impact ofexpanding
Chinese energy exploration on foreign and security policy, "Japan argues that it has a right to
claim its share of resources of oil/gas which are found straddling the intermediate line
between the economic zones of the two countries. I 16
114 Ibid, p.123
115 The Japan Times, "China chided after starting to drill for gas", (11 Aug 2005),
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin.pI5?nn2005081Ia3.htm
116 Ingolf Kiesow, "China's quest for energy; impact upon foreign and security policy", Swedish Defence
Research Agency, (November 2004) available online: http://www.foi.se/upload/english/reports/chinas-
guest-fair I371.pdf
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In reference to this claim, the Yomiuri Shimbun maintained in April 2005 that Japanese
Trade and Industry Minister Shoichi Nakagawa had said the government was "exercising our
sovereign right" when he said it would start procedures to grant drilling rights to private
firms unless China agrees to stop its development of the Chunxiao and Duanqiao gas fields
along the Japan-China median line. The newspaper continues by noting that "the
government has concluded that the two gas fields are linked to Japanese gas fields under the
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In a similar vein, the Asahi Shimbun explained that because the border between the two
countries' EEZ had never been finalised, Japan had repeatedly urged Beijing to call a halt to
its exploratory activities, which had begun in the autumn of2003. When no response had
117 Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo rattling drill bits/But will new tough line on gas fields make China blink?", (3
Afril 2005), http://www.vomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm
I J "So hard to be friends", The Economist, (March 23 2005),
http://w.vw.economist.com/printerfriendlv.cfrn?storv ID=3786409
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been forthcoming, the newspaper reports that in March 2005 a (ruling) Liberal Democratic
Party committee presented the government with a proposal to grant test drilling rights to
. • 119
pnvate compames.
In attempting to solve the thorny issue of the contested oil fields, both countries have
proffered different solutions. Japan has proposed a median line between both coasts, while
China has continued to draw the line at the continental shelf, which as the Asahi Shimbun
points out "is closer to Japan than the median line.,,12o Thus, the decision by Japan to initiate
procedures to grant Japanese firms the right to conduct test drilling was in accordance with
the Japanese held view that their territory extended until the median line - that is the 'line'
that divides the area ofoverlapping EEZs. Yet as the China Daily asserts, "China holds that
the line is determined by the Continental shelf on China's side, over which China claims
exclusive rights.,,'21 Thus, this move by Japan drew a quick response from the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, where the China Daily quotes Ministry spokesman Qin Gang saying the
move was a provocation against China's rights and norms in international relations. He
continued by saying that these actions were a "serious provocation" 122 and that China would
"retain the right to react further.,,123
119 Asahi Shimbun, "EEZ linked to China gas project", (2 April 2005),
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200504020119.html
120 Asahi Shimbun, "Editorial: gas fields driIling rights", (15 April 2005),
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200504150 142.html
121 Hu Xiao, "Koizumi caIls for dialogue on oil dispute",China Daily, IS April 2005),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/15/content 433303.htm
122 "Asian giants keep up war of words", BBC News, (IS April 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
paci fic!4443307.stm
123 Hu Xiao, "Koizumi calls for dialogue on oil dispute",China Daily, 15 April 2005),
http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/en gl ishldoc/2005-04/ IS/content 433303.hun
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Chinese condemnation of the decision by Japan to pursue its own exploration of the oil fields
in the East China Sea continued when vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned the
Japanese ambassador to inform him that China would not tolerate the move. He claimed that
China "firmly opposes the dangerous provocative act.,,124 The severity of this dispute was
demonstrated when the Japanese SelfDefense Agency included reference to it in its annual
report on national defence. The areas of concern mentioned in the report centred on Chinese
research activities in the waters near Japan in the context of Beijing's new focus on
modernising its military. 125
However, the contentious issue of drilling rights continued to simmer, as Japan and China
conducted working level talks in Beijing in March 2006 to discuss exploration rights in the
East China Sea. This meeting, the second in five months, ended without resolution as both
sides rejected out of hand the other's proposals. The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun claimed
that it was "questionable, however, whether they will be able to make progress in resolving
the controversy through continued talks.,,126 This is because China continues to reject
Japanese demands to stop drilling in areas that fall on the Japanese side of the median line-
namely because China believes that the continental shelf falls within the coastal waters of a
continental power and, as such, ignores any Japanese proposals with regard to the median
line. The more moderate Asahi Shimbun's editorial response to the deadlock was to
124 Ingolf Kiesow, "China's quest for energy; impact upon foreign and security policy", Swedish Defence
Research Agency, (November 2004) available online: hltp:/lwww.foi.se/uploadlenglish/reports/chinas-
guest-foir 137l.pdf
125 Ibid
126 "China pouring trouble on gas rich waters", Yomiuri Shimbun, (8 March 2006),
http://yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20060308TDY04004.htm
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conclude that "if the two nations cannot agree on how to draw the line, they might as well put
that business aside and go ahead with joint exploration."127
However, the issue ofjoint exploration of the oil and gas fields appears just as contentious
because both sides reject joint exploration of areas that they consider well within their own
sovereign territory - and thus the conflict continues. For example, a Chinese proposal to
jointly drill in the waters immediately surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands was rejected
by Japan because the islands are under its control and considered non-negotiable. Japanese
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe noted that "the proposal was not something that we can
accept." 128
Despite the high level of governmental dialogue surrounding the issue of drilling rights as
they relate to territorial dispute, the issue continues to have significance for the security
formulations within the region. The Yomiuri Shimbun reports that the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party intends to submit a bill to the Diet designed to ensure the safety of
Japanese dispatched to prospect for natural gas in the disputed waters of the East China Sea,
while the Democratic Party presented a bill aimed at defending Japan's maritime interests.
The newspaper concludes that "demonstrating Japan's determination to protect its
sovereignty and interests would cause China to reconsider behaving in a manner that violates
international rules.,,129
127 Asahi Shimbun, "Editorial: gas field dispute", (10 March 2006), http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-
asahiITKY2006031 10 13l.html
128 Ibid
129 "China pouring trouble on gas rich waters", Yomiuri Shimbun, (8 March 2006),
http://yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editoriaI/20060308TDY04004.htm
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Another gas field became an area of tension between the two states in April 2006 when
China reportedly banned all shipping in areas surrounding its Pinghu gas fields until
September. l3o China is extracting the natural gas from an area beyond the extent of Japan's
claimed EEZ; however, the gas field is believed to extend well into the area claimed by Japan.
The largely unknown size and dimension of the gas field further complicates the diplomacy,
as it unclear to what extent the field extends across the Japanese proposed median line, and
what effect Chinese drilling might have on any future Japanese attempts to extract gas from
the same field. The ban is thought to allow for Chinese workers to expand piping in the area,
despite Japanese requests that no drilling takes place until an agreement is reached between
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In the eyes of the Japanese, this event, while included with territorial disputes such as the
Senkaku islands and continuing disagreement with China over the Chunxiao fields, raised the
spectre of increasing Chinese power projection in the East China Sea. For a trading state
such as Japan, any threat to shipping lanes in whatever form it takes is a major threat which




is considered central to its national security. Thus, in describing the nature of Sino-Japanese
relations following both the unsuccessful attempts to resolve the gas and oil field disputes
and the controversies of the Yasukuni shrine, the BBC noted that relations between Japan
and China had plummeted in 2006 to their lowest point in decades. m
Thus, in 2006 Sino-Japanese relations appear to be delicately balanced over the issue of
energy supplies, formulated in terms of historically based mistrust of each others intentions
and driven by mutual anxieties. On the one hand is China's increasing need to access oil and
gas to fuel its growing economy; and on the other hand are Japan's twin fears of an
expansionist Chinese threat to both the vital shipping arteries upon which that country relies
and to its own need for secure energy resources in an environment of spiralling oil prices.
However, as Hilton notes, the jostling for predominance by China and Japan is inherently
paradoxical because the levels of mutual economic dependence that characterise their
relationship are far more extensive than at any time in history. If one were to add the US into
the mix, the relationship becomes even more complicated: China relies on the American
market to feed its export-led economy; the "US is dependent on Beijing continuing to buy
and hold Washington's mounting foreign debt", 133 and the US has maintained a strong allied
relationship both economically and militarily with Japan since the end of the Second World
War. Therefore, Hilton concludes, that a "Major conflict would be serious for all three." Yet
132 Daniel Griffiths, "China, Japan in high level talks", BBC News, (23 May 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/5008470.stm
133 Jsabel Hilton, "When the safety valve blows", The Guardian, (April] 5 2005),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0.7369.1460366.00.htm I
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the nagging tensions over energy competition in the region continue to provide compelling
scenarios in which escalating conflict between the two powers can be envisaged.
Enerw Competition - militariJ dimensions
Energy competition between the two states has assumed militaristic dimensions in the past
two years. Bajpaee describes several incursions by Chinese ships and submarines into
Japanese territorial waters, including an incident in November 2004 when a Chinese
submarine was pursued by Japanese ships for two days across the East China Sea. Bajpaee
notes that
While China offered a swift apology for the incursion, this was
soon followed by the intrusion of a Chinese research vessel into
Japanese waters near the island of Okinotori. The vessel is
believed to have been surveying the seabed for oil and gas
drilling purposes. This was the 34th maritime research exercise
by Chinese vessels within Japan's EEZ in 2004, up from eight in
2003. 134
The increasing tension between the two states in the East China Sea must also be viewed in
terms of the re-emergence of an assertive Japan, embodied by the Koizumi style of
leadership. As the Economist states, "Koizumi has sought throughout his tenure to test
Japan's pacifist limits.,,135 Thus, in the context of the Sino-Japanese territorial and energy
competition that is occurring in the East China Sea, the Economist describes a significant
134 Chietigji Bajpaee, "Setting the stage for a new cold war: china's quest for energy security", The Power
and Interest News Report, (25 Feb 2005), http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view report&report id=?72
135 The Economist, "From pacifism to populism - Japan's foreign policy", (10 July 2004), volume 327,
issue 8383
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incident that occurred in December 200 I when the Japanese Coast Guard pursued, engaged
in a gun battle, and eventuaIly sank a North Korean spy ship that had entered its EEZ but,
however, not into Japan's more narrowly defined territorial waters. The Economist continues
by pointing out, "the incident highlighted Japan's changing attitude towards its armed
forces.,,136 Indeed, a more assertive Japanese foreign policy and readiness to use its armed
forces makes the nature of Sino-Japanese rivalry over territory and energy resources in the
East China Sea increasingly more significant to greater regional security. Thus, when
considering the failure of China and Japan to reach agreement over exploration rights to
energy reserves and the longstanding issue of the Yasukuni shrine, the relationship, arguably,
could be considered to be at its lowest point since the two states normalised relations in 1972.
Further, Deans points out that "there has been a remarkable growth of pro-Taiwan sentiment
in Japan. There is not one pro-China figure in the Koizumi cabinet.,,)37 Consequently, the
perception of a China threat is more likely to be encouraged in a political environment where
key players such as Defence Agency chief General Yoshinori Ono are believed to be ardent
militarists.
According to some analysts such as Chalmers Johnson, Japanese remilitarisation has been
occurring despite the constitutional restraint of Article Nine, which prohibits the Japanese
state from offensive military capacity. Johnson notes that because of widespread fears of
Japanese rearmament in the region, notably in China, "the Japanese government has launched
a stealth program of incremental rearmament. Since 1992, it has enacted 21 major pieces of
136 1bid
137 Phil Deans, quoted in Chalmers Johnson "No Longer the 'Lone Superpower': coming to terms with
China", Japan Policy Research Institute, working paper no. 105 (March 2005),
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security-related legislation, nine in 2004 alone.,,138 He continues by pointing out that this
impetus towards 'normalisation' of the military includes an expanding military budget,
legitimising and legalising the sending of troops abroad,joining the American missile
defence program, and a growing acceptance of military solutions to international problems.
Prime Minister Koizumi's decision to send a contingent of Japanese troops to Iraq in 2003
was seen by many as an indication of how the Koizumi administration wished to make Japan
a key player on the international stage and one that would ultimately sound the death knell
for the constitutionally-bound pacifist Japan.
Beyond the issue of energy competition and security, Japanese concerns over an emerging
China as an expansionist hegemonic superpower takes two forms: the first is based on
concerns that, ultimately, China's economic growth would erode Japanese export markets;
and the second (as Jiang notes) relates to China filling the power vacuum in Southeast Asia
that was left following both the downsizing of US forces and the almost complete withdrawal
of Russian forces in the early 1990s.1 39 Integral to this form ofthreat assessment, are the
issues ofTaiwan and the growth of Chinese military expenditure. Chinese bullying of what
it considers a renegade province has long been an area of tension in the region and recent
Japanese statements in conjunction with its US ally that Taiwan is a 'mutual security
concern' is telling. This statement in April 2005 as the Economist notes, "took Japan a step
further past its constitutional restrictions on military action," 140 and was perhaps the first
138 Chalmers Johnson "No Longer the 'Lone Superpower': coming to terms with China", Japan Policy
Research Institute, working paper no. 105 (March 2005), http://www.jpri.org.publications/working
papers/wp IOS.html p.3
I39Wenrang Jiang, "The Japanese Assessment of the 'China Threat''', in Yee and Story (Eds), The China
Threat: Perceptions Myths and Reality, p. 155
140 "So hard to be friends", The Economist, (March 23 2005),
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flickering of a resurgent Japanese assertiveness in foreign policy and indicates a movement
away from the constrictions of Article Nine. It also highlighted the overall perception of
China that had been defined by Japan's National Defence Programme Outline as a source of
'concern' for Japan.\4\
Japanese moves to align itself clearly with the US in defence of Taiwan against any hostile
moves by mainland China follows the announcement ofan 'anti-secession' bill by the
People's Republic of China in March 2005 that outlines the legal steps required before China
would take action against Taiwan. PRC legislator Wang Zhaoguo was quoted as saying: "so
long as there is a glimmer of hope for peaceful reunification, we will exert our utmost to
make it happen rather than give it up." However, he added that, "no sovereign state can
tolerate secession, and every sovereign state has the right to use necessary means to defend
its sovereignty and territorial integrity.,,\42 Significantly, China's efforts to increase its
defence capabilities include Taiwan within its defence perimeter. Thus, the mutual
perceptions of mistrust between China and Japan have been further strained through
opposing positions on the issue of Taiwan, and are set against the backdrop of increasing
Chinese military expenditure. Indeed, a May 2006 Pentagon report on Chinese military
expansion in East Asia noted that "the pace and scope of China's military build-up already
place regional military balances at risk.,,\43
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When attempting to understand modem Sino-Japanese relations in terms of mutual
perceptions of threat, and founded on an understanding of security dilemma, the
modernization of China's military is a key element. Recent announcements that China has
increased its defence budget by more than 12 percent to close to 30 billion dollars,144 a
figure that The Economist notes is believed in Japan to understate true spending by 30-50
percent l45 appears to be matched by moves in Japan to construct a Theatre Missile Defence
Program in conjunction with the US and to continue lobbying the European Union not to lift
its arms embargo on China that was put in place in 1989 following the crackdown on




However, despite rapid increases in Chinese defence expenditure, it should be noted that
Japan is one of the world's biggest spenders on defence. The Stockholm International Peace
Institute (SIPRI), which tracks international military spending and arms procurement, notes
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that for 2003 Japan was second only to the US in terms of real dollars spent on defence. 147
This is because while the Japanese constitution limits military spending to one percent of
GNP, the total size of Japan's economy means that in absolute terms it has one of the world's
largest defence budgets. However, it must be noted that up to 11 percent 148 of this money
goes to paying for the continued presence and support of approximately 50 000 US troops in
Okinawa and other bases around the country. As Neary notes, Japan's armed forces are
comparable to many European countries, but are small when compared with its Asian
neighbours and are ultimately constrained by Article Nine. 149 The combined Air, Marine and
Ground Self Defence forces numbered 240 000 personnel in 2003 with over 500 aircraft and
160 surface ships and submarines. 15o Dependence on the US is highlighted by the fact that
Japan lacks long-range bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines and so in terms of
its constitutional restriction cannot project power beyond its borders.
Despite increased Chinese defence expenditure, Gill claims that Beijing continues to send
mixed diplomatic signals, on the one hand flexing its military muscles with manoeuvres
intended to intimidate Taiwan; and at the same time reducing the overall size of the PLA and
making peaceful overtures to most of its neighbours. However, in terms of what he describes
as 'sources of concern' which contribute to the perception ofa China threat, he notes that:
"with economic modernization as the number one priority of China's grand strategy, (has
come) an increased concern with the stability and protection of coastal, offshore, and sea-
147 "The Major Spenders in 2003", Stockholm International Peace Institute, (accessed 31 May 2005),
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based material resources, communications routes and trade access." This is compounded by
what Gill points out is a growing recognition that likely threats and security concerns to
China will emanate from the east - Japan, South Korea and US forces in the Pacific,I51 Thus,
the increasing levels of tension in the region can be understood in terms of security dilemma
built upon the considerable foundation of historical mistrust and the extent to which
economic considerations drive territorial disputes - most notably the issue of energy
resources.
As a result, the political events that are unfolding in Japan now can be seen as the
culmination ofa process of moving beyond what are perceived as the constraints of history to
embrace what Ohta Hiroshi describes as a more "muscular" foreign policy,152 As Hiroshi
also notes, the desire to 'normalise' Japan's position on the world stage has many supporters
across the political spectrum. In this way, the drive for normalisation and a greater
international role for Japan can be seen to be interacting with realist perceptions of threat and
what many consider as the fundamental security requirements of the twenty first century.
Ultimately, the debate in Japan with regard to constitutional change and the resulting
remilitarisation reflects the national question in that country - namely what future role will
Japan play in the region, and how will the rise of China affect Japan's position in a post cold
war world. This debate about how the country should position itself for the twenty first
century is sensitive and divisive because reform and especially rearmament requires what
151 Bates Gill, "Chinese military modernization and arms proliferation in the Asia-Pacific", in Pollack and
Yang (eds), In China's shadow regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development,
RAND, 1998
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amounts to a sea-change in terms of the essential national characteristics that have defined
Japan since the end of the Second World War. Thus, despite the pacifist ethos that has
characterised Japan for the past sixty years, the global energy imperatives that now face the
country are forcing a reappraisal of this ethos, and the desire to maintain relevance in the
global arena is driving this process. In this light, legislators face the challenge of formulating
Japan's position on the world stage and thereby balancing the complex dynamics of more
assertive national objectives with the pacifist norms that, while being somewhat eroded, still
hold considerable sway amongst the electorate.
Consequently, talk about rearmament in Japan is essentially the first step in a long-term
vision of the country operating outside of the shadow of US influence and umbrella military
protection. The questions remain as to whether or not Japan will become an eventual
balancer of Chinese power in the region, as well as to what extent the Japanese economy can
transform itself and remain globally competitive following a decade of stagnation.
Accordingly, any attempt to forecast the dynamics of East-Asian interaction after Japan has
normalised its military is dependent on the manner in which such reform takes place,
especially in the light of Sino-Japanese tensions, and the extent to which the much-touted UN
reform would allow Japan to assume a more significant role in global affairs. However, the
prospects ofa more assertive Japan eager to defend its position and improve its status could
place further strain on a region already beset by tensions in the Taiwan straits and North
Korea. Thus, any vision of a rearmed Japan would have to be tempered by its history in the
region and the present balance of power.
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Therefore, the factors that influence and constitute Sino-Japanese relations are multifaceted
and the forces pushing the two states together often appear as powerful as the dynamics
driving them further apart. As Nish noted, "the relationship between China and Japan is a
many-layered cake, impossible to eat all at once"153 and, as such, the regional security
consequences of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations must be addressed. Thus, the question
of Chinese expansion into the South China Sea in the context of both countries' mutual
energy concerns and Japan's overall view of the threatening nature of these actions due to
Japan's geographic dependence on free trade routes - focused against an emboldened
Japanese military, makes the evaluation of Sino-Japanese relations into the future central to
an understanding of the security considerations in the region.
153 lan Nish, "An Overview of Relations Between China and Japan, 1895-1945"in Christopher Howe (Ed),
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ChapterThree
Irredentism and Securit9 Concerns in the South China Sea
The complicated dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations in the post-cold war era, where
competition for control and access to energy resources plays a role in determining mutual
policy formulation and regional engagement has considerable security implications for the
region. Accordingly, when considering Chinese expansionist moves in the South China Sea,
driven by that country's growing thirst for oil, a number of significant issues with regard to
Sino-Japanese relations emerge. Principal amongst those are factors that could see energy
competition not only being central to future conflict in the region but also could influence the
trajectory of other relations such as Japanese concerns over secure sea routes and Chinese
militarization (as a consequence of its energy policy) of the South China Sea - including
Chinese influence over the strategically significant Straits of Malacca. [n this light, the near-
total dependence of Japan on imported oil supplies increases the significance ofevents in the
South China Sea as well as raises questions about strategic oil supplies and the ability of
Japan to withstand a I970s-style oil shock. Against this background, where unrestricted
access to oil can be seen as central to both countries' national interests, the extent of Chinese
military modernisation and Japanese re-militarization must be examined.
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In assessing the likelihood ofconflict in the region arising from energy concerns and
exacerbated by Chinese expansionist moves, Herberg notes,
China's increasingly mercantilist strategy to assert
control of oil and natural gas supplies and transport routes
risks fueling tensions and conflict in a region where the
lack of regional institutions to manage conflict is already
a major problem and a region which is facing a sensitive
transition to accommodate China's rising power over the
next two decades. Energy competition is beginning to
seriously aggravate existing and, in some cases,
deepening rivalries between China and her neighbors. 154
Chinese expansionist moves in the South China Sea have invariably been driven by the
availability of energy resources and subsequently defended in terms of a re-assertion of
sovereignty. However, as Kenny explains, the biggest problem for China "is that nearly all
the significant oil and gas found to date in the South China Sea is off the continental shelf of
the Riparian nations.,,155 This means that almost every Chinese claim in the South China Sea
is contested by another country, and generally increases the variables when considering the
role of energy competition as a catalyst for possible conflict in the region.
As the Swedish Defence Research Agency describes, the history of maritime dispute in the
South China Sea dates back to 1968 when the same UN report that stated the possibility of
oil fields surrounding the Senakaku islands revealed possible oil deposits in the South China
Sea - most notably in the Spratly islands where oil was discovered in 1976. In 2006 however,
"up to 65 islets, reefs and rocks in the South China Sea are occupied by military troops flying
154 M. Herbert, "China's energy situation and the implications for Asia and the US", Testimony before the
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various national tlags." Further, the Agency describes how changes in international law and
the emergence of the principle of economic zones gave "China a new opportunity to lay
claim to vast areas of the South China Sea. The urge to do so was reinforced by the fact that
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In cementing its claims across the region, the Chinese government passed a 'Law on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone' in 1992, which as Roy describes, "claimed nearly
156 IngolfKiesow, "China's quest for energy; impact upon foreign and security policy", Swedish Defence
Research Agency, (November 2004) available online: http://www.foi.se/upload/english/reports/chinas-
911est-foirl37I .pdf
157 "South China Sea oil claims", available at http://commllnity.middleburv.edu/-scs/maps/oilclaims.gif
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the entire South China Sea as territorial waters.,,158 According to this law, what China
defined as its territorial waters was extended from 37 000 square kilometres to 2.8 million
square kilometres, 159 including the Paracel and Spratly islands and a considerable area of the
South China Sea that included the majority of its oil and gas fields.
These claims, while clearly motivated by the oil reserves that the area contained, were
couched by the Chinese in terms of a re-exertion of sovereignty on territory that had always
been theirs. As Roy notes, "for Beijing, the South China Sea islands issue inevitably falls
into the context of the 'Century of Shame'. The Chinese Communist Party has publicly
adopted the line that Chinese ownership of the islands dates from ancient times ... The issue
is thus, interpreted as another case of opportunistic foreigners exploiting China's weakness to
commit violations of Chinese sovereignty.,,16o Weaknesses which an increasingly powerful
China seem determined to relegate to history as they continue to exert greater influence
globally and in the region - driven by a single-minded pursuit of policies aimed at securing
all energy resources within its growing sphere of influence.
However, beyond the rhetoric, Chinese claims to islands such as the Spratlys and Paracels
have resulted in increased militarization and tension across the region, most notably with the
Philippines regarding a partly submerged feature of the Spratly Islands known appropriately
as Mischief Reefwhich is only 135 nautical miles from the Philippine province ofPalawan-
158 Denny Roy, "Restructuring foreign and defence policy: the People's Republic of China", in McGrew
&Brook (eds), Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 147
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well within the Philippine's EEZ. Pablo-Baviera describes how an increasing Chinese
presence on the reef throughout the I990s led to military structures being put up, and
Philippine fishermen detained by the Chinese navy. 161 These Chinese actions highlight what
Stenseth describes as the commonly held fear across the region regarding China's slow
'naval march' down the South China Sea. Stenseth points out that
The Philippines now fears that China will use the reef as a
staging base for expansion towards the potentially oil-rich
Reed Bank... these features may then in turn be used as a
quasi-legal basis for claiming EEZs. If turned into military
outposts, they could be used as staging bases for launching
military attacks on islands occupied by other claimants. 162
Figure 3.2
Thus, China's increasing thirst for oil is having far-reaching security consequences in the
South China Sea and beyond with increasing militarization of the region. In describing the
Spratly Islands, Bajpaee notes that "five states have permanent military garrisons on the
161 Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, "Perceptions of a China Threat: A Philippine perspective", in The China
Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, Yee & Storey (eds), London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p.248
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atolls in addition to surveillance facilities under the guise of 'bird watching towers', weather
huts and tourist facilities."I64 Bajpaee continues by noting that
these regional and territorial disputes have the potential to
escalate into international conflicts, given the importance of
the waterways to international trade and the number of
bilateral security commitments between regional states and
major world powers, such as between the US and the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand ...For example,
following the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in
February 1995 ... the United States conducted naval exercises
with the Philippines close to the disputed territory. The joint
exercises may be regarded as a warning to China's
increasingly aggressive posturing in the region. 165
However, from the Chinese point of view, energy security is intimately linked with the
country's national interests, and as such expanding Chinese influence in the South China Sea
is a priority. As Danreuther notes, "for a developing and energy importing country like
China, a rise in the price of energy or a disruption of energy supply can have a significant
detrimental impact... It is quite natural, therefore, that an energy importing country,
particularly one pursuing a fast process of economic development, should devise an effective
energy security policy.,,166 Thus, while China's actions with regard to its territorial claims in
both the East and South China Seas can be understood in terms of a formulation of energy
security, the protection of, and power projection over, vital import routes becomes an integral
aspect of a country's energy security framework.
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The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines energy security as "the
availability of energy at all times in various forms in sufficient quantities and at affordable
prices." 167 Yet beyond this, the countries of East Asia, which rely heavily on imported oil
would include secure import routes into that definition. As Fesharaki asserts, "energy
security concerns have always been central to geopolitical interests. Throughout history, the
effort to secure access to energy sources and ensure adequate transport routes has demanded
technological, commercial, diplomatic and military agility.,,168 May emphasizes this by
noting that for the countries of East Asia "the main source of insecurity connected with
energy use will be the anticipation, on the part of countries partially or wholly dependent on
imports of fuels and energy technologies, of developments that would interfere with either
energy-related imports or the exports needed to pay for them.,,169
Thus, China's moves to defend and ensure its own influence over the South China Sea can be
understood in terms of classic security dilemma as causing considerable anxiety amongst
other regional powers - notably Japan whose national security is intimately linked with open
trade routes. Indeed, Japan's reliance on petroleum imports is far greater than China's, and
as such the maintenance of open sea lanes through the South China Sea is central to that
country's security formulations.
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South China Sea and the securit!;f ot trade routes
When considering the importance of the South China Sea in the context of regional security
and the extent to which Chinese resource-driven expansion has influenced Sino-Japanese
relations the question of open trade routes is paramount. As Wiencek points out, it is
estimated that nearly half the world's shipping - in terms of tonnage - passes through the
South China Sea each year, as well as 75 percent of Japan's oil passes through these sea
lanes. l7o Wiencek continues by noting that China has linked its island occupations with a
strategy and force build-up that is designed to project power to the furthest reaches of the
South China Sea, "Beijing is thus positioning itself to exert control- in time - over the
region's vital sea lanes and airspace.',17l Central to this objective is guaranteeing the security
of the sea-lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South East Asian seas and the Indian
Ocean.
This process was begun with the Chinese ratification of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea in 1996 when it stated that it would feel free to request "a foreign state to
obtain advance approval from or to give prior notice to ... (China) .. for the passage of
warships through the territorial sea.,,172 The significance of this statement is accentuated
when considering that virtually the entire South China Sea is claimed by China and the
occupation of islands creates the scenario whereby the whole area is perceived in Beijing to
170 David Wiencek, "South China Sea Flashpoint", china BrieJ: volume 1, issue 2, 200 I, available at
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be Chinese territorial waters. The Swedish Defence Research Agency points out that China
already has two military zones in force in which ships may only enter with permission. "In
the United States, Japan and other nations surrounding the South China Sea, these regulations
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As figure 3.2 indicates, the sea routes of the South China Sea are notable for the narrow
'choke-points' between Sumatra and Java (the Sunda Strait), and the Strait of Malacca,
through which all ships must pass when travelling between the Indian Ocean and the South
J73 Ibid
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China Sea. Yet with regard to Chinese power projection across the region, the International
Energy Agency, which produced the map, indicates the position of a Chinese naval base at
Mergui in Myanmar, as well as an observation post in the narrow Malacca strait and a radar
station on a Myanmar-owned Coco island in the Andaman Sea. These positions, when
combined with a Chinese military presence on the Spratly and Paracel islands and sweeping
territorial claims across the South China Sea clearly point to the extent of emerging Chinese
power projection across the region.
As Kenny describes, a major concern for China is that the vast majority of its external oil and
gas flows will have to transit the narrow chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca - of which
nearly two-thirds of the tonnage via Malacca is crude. Similarly, almost 80 percent of the oil
imports of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan go through the same route. l75 The 800 kilometre
long strait that varies in width from 40 to 160 kilometres has long been a factor in the
determination of naval and trade dominance in the region. Speaking during the Communist
Party Congress in December 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao commented that the
"Malacca dilemma is a key consideration for China's long-term energy security. Certain
powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the strait.,,176
While the reference to 'certain powers' clearly indicates the United States, whose naval
dominance of the region is still uncontested, Hu is also indicating a change in China's stance
towards a more aggressive position designed to ensure its own energy security through the
greater projection of Chinese military strength.
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This power projection includes building a blue water navy and formulating strategically
positioned alliances with countries such as Myanmar and Pakistan, which allows for greater
Chinese influence beyond the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and beyond. As Lee
points out, the estimates of China's imported oil requirements are expected to grow
exponentially, "consequently, the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz could emerge as
crucial waterways for China's maritime interests. China believes that through close co-
operation with Myanmar, Pakistan, and Iran, it could guarantee the security of sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) in Southeast Asian Sea and the Indian Ocean.,,177
The Chinese alliance with Myanmar has included political and military support for the
regime in Yangon, which is facing increasing international pressure over human rights abuse
and lack of democratic processes, with an estimated US$ 1.2 billion worth of weapons and
other military equipment. As Lee describes, in return, Beijing has secured a market for its
sizable defence industry and has ensured access to intelligence on movements through the
congested shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. 178 Yet, as Lee
explains, the Chinese presence in Burma
Caused concerns to India and Japan: India's concern relates to
Coco Island, which is an outlet to the Bay of Bengal and the
Andaman Sea and where the Indian Navy had hitherto held
sway; and Japan's concern relates to Mergui Island as an
entrance to the Malacca Strait which Japan considers to be a
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China is also assessing the feasibility of oil pipelines from Myanmar to China's South
Western provinces - thereby lessening its dependence on the Sea routes of Southeast Asia.
Such possibilities demonstrate clearly that the alliance with Myanmar has profound strategic
importance for Chinese power projection across the region that is underpinned by China's
energy security requirements. Lee asserts that People's Liberation Army strategic analysts
have identified the controlling of the Malacca Strait as one of China's most urgent tasks, but
also notes that "China's strategic hold over the waterway would, however, provoke responses
from regional countries and the United States." Lee continues: "However, the three littoral
nations (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore) are unlikely to contend with China directly
over the Malacca Strait. The potential challenge will likely come from Japan and the United
States." I 80
Thus, China's energy-driven strategic objectives are being implemented from the Indian
Ocean through the Malacca Strait to the South China Sea, where as Wiencek asserts, "China
is clearly pursuing a strategy of expanding its military sphere of influence in the area,,18l with
the establishment of military installations on a variety of islands and remote reefs across the
South China Sea.
In the Paracels, Wiencek claims the Chinese military presence includes a battery of
'Silkworm' anti-ship cruise missiles, "the Silkworm has a range of some fifty-nine miles and
could be used to threaten nearby shipping.,,182 Such a threat would have considerable
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resonance in Japan. In highlighting Japan's near total dependence on access to open sea
routes, Graham describes Japanese sea lane security as "a matter of life and death." As such,
he argues that "the sea-lane issue demonstrates long-term continuity in Japan's strategic
geography" that "transcends its experiment in constitutional pacifism.,,183 He claims that
Japanese decision makers continue to view their island nation as resource-poor and
surrounded by varying levels of hostility - thus making their dependence on the sea vital to
both their prosperity and continued existence. In this regard, Japanese access to the trade
routes of the South China Sea has been guaranteed for almost 50 years by the US seventh
fleet, 184 as a component of the US-Japan Alliance.
Further, as Lee describes,
The Japanese economy has benefited from safe shipping of its
goods and energy resources through the Malacca Strait for more
than half a century, owing to not only the political stability of the
littoral states, but also the presence of the U.S. Navy in securing
the SLOCs. However, the maritime environment in the
Southeast Asian seas has been changing with China's naval
ambitions in the region. It is reported that People's Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have sometimes stopped, boarded,
and searched Japanese, Russian and Taiwanese ships in the East
and South China Sea on the pretext of searching for contraband,
or challenging those ships in relation to their constituting a threat
to navigation. If the Southeast Asian straits were closed as a
result of China's attempts at control, Japanese shipping would be
forced to navigate around Australia, and this could result in an
increase of 60 percent to shipping costS.1 85
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Japan's current defence plans call for the protection of sea-lanes up to 1000 nautical miles
from Tokyo, which does not include SLOCs in the South China Sea or the Malacca Strait.
However, Japan's defence guidelines in recent times point to an expanded role for the Marine
Self Defence Forces, both in terms of being less tied to US forces and in terms of an
expanded mandate. The 2005 National Defence Programme Outline not only included China
as a source of 'concern' for Japan but ajoint statement with the US included Taiwan as a
mutual security concern, 186 thereby indicating the possibility of a significantly enhanced
Japanese regional presence. Thus, as Takashi Oka has stated, "how China and Japan define
their relationship with each other and with the U.S. will determine the long term stability of
the arc from Hokkaido to the Malacca Strait.,,187
Japan's apparent gradual shift from its post-war defensive and pacifist posture to include a
more active military role in the region could have serious implications regarding the
possibility ofan energy-resource fuelled conflict. The changes in Japan's stance with regards
China can be seen as driven by rising nationalism and a need to secure its own energy
resources. As Suganama points out, the US security umbrella does not completely reassure
the Japanese. In particular, China's naval expansion is increasingly viewed as a direct threat
to Japan's energy security and this threat perception is exacerbated by China's territorial
claims to the Senkakul Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. 188
186 "So hard to be friends", The Economist, (March 23 2005),
http://www.economisLcom/printerfriendly.cfm?slory ID=3786409
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In this way, the Koizumi-Ied impetus in Japan to re-exert itselfmilitarily and assume a
position in the region that better represents its economic might is taking shape through a
variety of means. Beyond the questions of military expenditure that were discussed in the
previous chapter, Japanese naval expansion has made small, yet significant, moves towards
maintaining a presence in the South China Sea. A process that began in April 2000 when the
Japanese Coast Guard offered to lead a maritime enforcement operation against piracy in the
straits of Malacca - a move welcomed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Yet, as Kidd
points out, this initiative was welcomed with the clear understanding that the main concern
was Chinese expansionist moves rather than increasing numbers of piracy attacks. 189 Further,
Danreuther maintains that "all these countries have been enlarging their naval capacities in
response to the perceived Chinese threat, which has sparked a regional naval arms race."190
Yet it was the Gulf War that saw the first overseas deployment of Self Defence Forces (SDF)
since the end of World War 11, when Japanese minesweepers engaged in limited operations
in the Persian Gulf. Following a number of peacekeeping operations and the attacks of
September 11,2001, the nature of the US-Japan alliance was expanded when the Diet passed
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which enabled the dispatch of Japanese forces to
provide logistical support to US activities in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. 191 Thus,
despite constitutional restriction, the post-September II deployment of the Japanese military
has continued unabated. By late 2004, seven MSDF vessels with over 1000 crew had been
dispatched on rotation to the Indian Ocean - including the Aegis equipped destroyer
189 J. Kidd, "China's naval expansion", Strategic Pointers, December, 2000
190 Roland Danreuther, "Asian security and China's energy needs", International Relations ofthe Asia
Pacific, volume 3, 2003, p.206
Iql Hook, Gilson, Hughes & Dobson, Japan's International Relations - politics, economics and security,
New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 13-14
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Kirishima whose advanced offensive capabilities include the ability to track up to 200
aircraft and missiles simultaneously while also launching simultaneous attacks against up to
ten targets l92. Significantly, Japanese MSDF ships escorted the US aircraft carrier Kittyhawk
through the South China Sea to support it in operations in the Indian Ocean, thereby steadily
increasing the presence of Japanese forces in the region.
Thus, while the strengthening of Japan's naval position through increasing procurement of
hardware and joining the US seventh fleet on manoeuvres in the South China Sea can be
traced to energy security priorities and a desire for greater participation and power projection
in the region, it must also be understood in terms of the growing nationalist sentiment in
Japan. The Yomiuri Shimbun reports a nationwide Japanese opinion poll that indicates a
reflection of public opinion in favour of a more assertive stance with regards China. "In reply
to a question asking whether Koizumi should take a more assertive approach to China, 77
percent ofpollees said he should be more articulate in asserting Japan's national interest."
While "only four percent said Japan should take a more conciliatory approach towards
China.,,193
However, Chinese military modernisation and expansion has clearly not gone unnoticed in
Japan. Takahara, writing in the Japan Times describes a Japanese defence white paper
presented to the Diet which notes "it is necessary to keep paying attention to these
modernisation trends and to carefully evaluate whether the modernization of China's military
forces exceeds the levels necessary for its national defense." The report also maintains that
192 Ibid, pp. 164- 165
193 Kazunori Ozaki, "Political Pulse/ Time ripe for candid approach to China", Yomiuri Shimbun, (IS June
2005), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm
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Tokyo is closely "monitoring activities" by China's naval vessels navigating near Japan's
territorial waters. Takahara goes on to point out that the "report was made public following
the Pentagon's assessment on China's military ... (which) said Beijing's buildup poses a
long-term threat to regional powers, including Japan and India.,,194
These sentiments, which are driving Japan's more assertive stance with regard to its energy
security and its position in the region, can also be discerned to be playing a role in
underpinning Chinese moves in the region. Valencia argues that China's policy towards the
Spratly islands is driven by a nationalist ambition to re-establish hegemonic power in the
region. He asserts that "China's actions in the South China Sea is the result of a rising tide of
nationalism that seems to be replacing socialism as the preferred societal glue.,,195 In a
similar vein, Christensen claims that the strong popular sentiments in China about Taiwan
and Japan combined with the dangers ofhypernationalisation and jingoism that appear to be
accompanying reform in China could be disastrous in the context of Sino-Japanese security
competition. 196
All that notwithstanding, the potential for increased tension and conflict in the South China
Sea driven by the pursuit of energy resources alone is played down by Danreuther who
claims that the role oil does play
... is in justifying actions which actually have other rationales.
Since oil is so critical to the economies of all these countries, it
194 Kanako Takahara, "China buildup on Defense Agency radar", The Japan Times, (3 August 2005),
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.pI5?nn20050803a3.htm
195 Mark Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Dispute: Conflicting claims and potential solutions in
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provides a justification to engage in conflicts that can be easily
understood and accepted by politicians and the general
public...The presumed risk to vital energy supplies, and the
competitive struggle for energy resources, is an effective means
to justify military and naval build-ups as well as territorial
expansion. 197
He continues by pointing out that any attempt by either Japan of China to disrupt the sea
lanes of the South China Sea would adversely affect their own positions and, as such, prefers
to derive an understanding of China's territorial claims in terms of what Johnston has termed
the 'hyper-sovereignty values' which dominate the thinking and behaviour of China's ruling
elite. 198
Consequently, an understanding of energy security in the region must incorporate an
examination of the nationalist or historical roots which underpin the behaviour of states in the
region. However, the growth in Chinese demand for energy resources in recent years
continues to be a significant factor in driving policy formulation with regard to the South
China Sea and Sino-Japanese relations. The dynamics of the region are changing constantly
and the exponential nature of the growth in Chinese demand for oil since the mid-1990s,
when combined with an international environment that has seen spiralling oil prices over the
same period, points to the increasing relevance of the energy issue. Added to this, Japan is
undergoing the dual processes ofeconomic growth following the' lost decade' of the 1990s,
which was characterised by economic stagnation, and a re-emerging nationalist impetus,
which is driving the country's response to territorial dispute in an environment of increasing
energy concerns.
197 Roland Danreuther, "Asian security and China's energy needs", International Relations a/the Asia
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Chapter Four
The 9uest for diversified and secure oilsu~
When considering the energy trends that underpin Sino-Japanese relations, there are two
significant aspects that characterise Sino-Japanese energy competition, namely, the need to
identify and secure energy supplies and the need to achieve greater diversification of supply.
Towards this end, both China and Japan are pushing energy concerns to the forefront of their
respective diplomatic efforts and, consequently, Sino-Japanese energy rivalry is taking on a
global dimension. The extent of the rivalry appears to be increasing as Chinese demand for
oil and gas imports grow exponentially and China seeks aggressively new sources of energy
supplies from Russia and Central Asia to Africa and Latin America. In part, this is because
the Chinese demand for oil on the world market is growing and China is therefore "coming to
rely increasingly on the same source that supplies most of the rest of the industrialised world
- the Middle East.,,199
While Middle Eastern sources of energy supplies continue to be the most significant for both
China and Japan, this study will focus on efforts by both countries to secure new suppliers,
199 Henry Kenny, "China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia", Asia Pac(fic Review, volume 11,
number 2, 2004, P 41
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driven by fears of instability in the Middle East and the overall annual increases in Chinese
demand that is forcing Chinese policymakers to look beyond the Middle East for future
energy security. For that reason, the present importance of the Middle East as an oil exporter
to both China and Japan is uncontested.. Yet, this study seeks to show how future energy
concerns and the drive to secure access to new energy suppliers have become significant
factors in the foreign policy formulation of both states and an important element in the
greater analysis of Sino-Japanese energy competition.
Figure 4.1
Graphic distribution of Japanese oil imports 2004
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The considerable effect that China's remarkable growth in demand for oil is having on world
oil prices is testimony to the inability of the Middle East alone to meet the energy needs of
China's rapidly expanding economy. Thus, China's need to diversify its sources of supply
has become central to maintaining its present rate of economic growth. Yet as Kenny points
out, "the thirst for oil and gas risks confrontation with other claimants, creates intense global
competition for resources, and raises the chance of long-term global shortages.,,201
Figure 4.2
Graphic distribution of Chinese oil imports 2004
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As the previous graphs indicate, the Middle East is a vital supplier to both China and
especially Japan. However, from the Chinese point of view; competition for oil from the
201 Henry Kenny, "China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia", Asia Pac(fic Review, volume 11,
number 2, 2004, P 44
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Middle East is already very intense with a growing American presence and entrenched
Japanese purchases as well as the considerable political instability, which characterises the
region. Thus, while many industrialised countries - Japan included - may benefit from
increasing trade with China, the costs in terms of higher world energy prices and increased
competition for access to secure and cost-effective sources of energy, has a significantly
negative effect on perceptions of China's growth. Accordingly, the ambiguous Sino-
Japanese relationship, which is characterised by worsening political tension and increasing
economic and cultural exchange, is also characterised by increasing competition over access
to oil and gas from Russia and the Central Asian states - with meaningful repercussions for
the formulation of mutual foreign policy objectives in the region.
Russia and the Central Asian States
The complexities of Sino-Japanese energy relations in East Asia are being exacerbated by
increasing competition to gain direct access to Russian oil supplies in the form of a proposed
oil pipeline. However, as the BBC reports, "Moscow has so far refused to commit to a
route.,,203 The Russian oil pipeline has been a contested issue for years with China proposing
a 2,300 km route that would bring the pipeline to Daqing, thereby linking with its existing oil
infrastructure and well-placed to feed the industrial cities of northern China. Japan on the
203 BBC News, "Putin hints at China oil pipeline", (22 March 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-
pacific/483 I624.stm
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other hand proposes a longer 4,300 km route through Siberia to the Pacific port ofNakhodka
which, arguably, could supply both Japan and South Korea.
Figure 4.3
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From the Japanese perspective, the Nakhodka option has two strategically important
advantages. Firstly, the pipeline could result in an estimated 10-15 percent reduction in
Japan's reliance on Middle Eastern Oil imports,205 and secondly, would provide an
invaluable supply of oil that was not subject to the costs or security concerns of shipping
crude through the South China Sea. However, as Lee explains, the same security concerns
are central to Chinese efforts to secure the oil pipeline to Daqing.
The Primary advantage of exploration in Central Asia and
Russia is that both the oil resource there and the overland
pipeline are not subject to US domination. Signs indicate
that China is concerned about whether it could stem the US
from imposing serious constraints on its striving for
unification with Taiwan. China is worried that in the event
of a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan, the US
would disrupt or even block the shipment of oil to China
204 BBC News, "Putin hints at China oil pipeline", (22 March 2006), http://news.bbc.co.ukJl/hi/worldlasia-
pacitic/4831624.stm
205 Richard Giragosian, "Sino-Japanese competition for Russia's far east oil pipeline project", Institute for
the Analysis of Global Security, available at http://www.iags.org/nOlI9063.htm
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from the Middle East via the Strait of Malacca in Southeast
Asia.206
Thus, in the context of the energy security concerns of both China and Japan with regard to
the vulnerability of sea routes in the South China Sea that were discussed in the previous
chapter, the strategic significance of the Russian pipeline becomes paramount. In this regard,
Giragosian explains that "the Chinese-Japanese competition for securing the role of primary
partner for Russian energy exports from the Far East is much less a commercial competition
than a complex courtship. The usual economic considerations inherent in a strictly
commercial competition do not apply in this case ... geopolitical considerations far outweigh
any and all commercial considerations.,,207
The geopolitical considerations that continue to overshadow different aspects of the proposed
Russian pipeline include a history of troubled relations between the two East Asian states and
Russia. Russo-Japanese political relations continue to be hamstrung by a territorial dispute
over the Kurile Islands, which were seized by Russia at the end of World War 11, and Japan's
cold war alliance with the United States. The dispute over the Kurile Islands is still
unresolved, and as a result Japan and Russia never signed a peace treaty at the end of the
War; consequently, the issue continues to be an impediment in Russo-Japanese relations.
Russia's relations with China on the other hand also suffer from considerable historical
divergence that stem from the cold war years, and are still marked by substantial mistrust of
206Lee Pak K. "China's quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline?", The Pacific Review, volume 18,
number 2, June 2005, p.270
207 Richard Giragosian, "Sino-Japanese competition for Russia's far east oil pipeline project", Institute for
the Analysis ofGlobal Security, available at http://www.iags.org/nOI19063.htm
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each other's motives. Yet, modern Russian reservations with regard to China are centred on
Russian fears ofChinese penetration into the Russian Far East (RFE), which as Giragosian
explains are "exacerbated by Russia's demographic vulnerabilities and by the remote and
poor state of the region's infrastructure."zo8 In describing anti-Chinese sentiments in Russia,
Lo describes the commonly-held perception of a 'yellow peril' sweeping into the Russian Far
East, he continues by noting that "such atavistic prejudices have been fuelled by fears of
Chinese irredentism regarding territories lost under the 'unequal treaties' of the nineteenth
century, and by the steady depopulation of the RFE, whose population has declined to less
that 7 million.,,209 While at the same time, a 2002 census showed that the Chinese population
in Eastern Siberia stood at 3.2 million and was growing steadily,ZIO thereby adding to the old
apprehensions in Russia over the future of Sino-Russian relations. In this regard, Russia
appears reticent to construct an oil pipeline running into an 'enclosed market', as Giragosian
notes, there is significant Russian reluctance for projects with only one 'end user'. But in the
reality of the global energy market, this fear may be essentially more political than
practical."ZI J The Russian government fears that if China where to become the monopoly
buyer of Russian oil, China could renegotiate import price or the volume of oil pumped to
China.
Thus, the Russian pipeline, like many facets of interstate relations in the region, is formulated
in terms of a number of complex variables the outcomes of which are difficult to predict, but
~08 Ibid
209 Bobo Lo, "The long sunset of strategic partnership: Russia's evolving China policy", International
Affairs, volume 80, number 2, March 2004
210 IngolfKiesow, "China's quest for energy; impact upon foreign and security policy", Swedish Defence
Research Agency, (November 2004) available online: http://www.foi.se/upload/english/reports/chinas-
quest-foirI371.pdf
211 Richard Giragosian, "Sino-Japanese competition for Russia's far east oil pipeline project", Institute for
the Analysis of Global Security, available at http://www.iags.org/nOI19063.htm
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which have considerable strategic and economic value to both China and Japan. The pipeline
was first proposed in 2003 following a visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Russia where
a 25 year agreement was signed with the Russian oil company Yukos for the supply 150
billion dollars worth ofcrude oil to China from eastern Siberia. However, as the Swedish
Defence Research Agency reports, "as soon as negotiations between Chinese and Russian
companies began, problems arose for China in the form of competing offers from Japan.
They were made in line with a several year old Japanese government policy aimed at raising
the proportion of oil imported from fields owned by Japan or Japanese companies.,,212
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also visited Russia in 2003 and lobbied for the
Nakhodka route, reportedly offering to provide low-interest loans for the project and
reiterated a Japanese commitment to purchase all the oil shipped through the pipeline. As
Lee details, the Japanese proposal was supported by Transneft, a Russian state-owned
pipeline operator, and was believed to be preferred by Moscow, where it was thought that
strategically a pipeline that was built solely on Russian soil would allow Russia to retain
control over its oil exports.213 - a factor that has increasing significance when considering
Russia's decision to cut off gas supplies to the Ukraine in the middle of winter over a price
dispute, as the New York Times noted regarding the incident, "whoever controls the taps also
holds the upper hand.,,214 Thus, this element of Russian leverage over both the pipeline
negotiations and the oil that will eventually flow through the pipeline is recognised in China
m Ingolf Kiesow, "China's quest for energy; impact upon foreign and security policy", Swedish Defence
Research Agency, (November 2004) available online: http://www.foi.se/upload/english/reports/chinas-
quest-foir1371.pdf
213 Lee Pak K. "China's quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline?", The Pac(tic Review, volume 18,
number 2, June 2005, p.275
214 Jad Mouawad, "Global Power, Redefined - Energy suppliers gain leverage through politics of the
pipeline", New York Times, 28 May 2006
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and Japan and is a considerable reminder of the unrelenting pursuit of energy security that
defines the foreign policy objectives of both countries. As Giragosian points out, the Russian
role as an arena for competition between China and Japan stems as much from Russian
energy strategy as from Sino-Japanese political rivalry. He notes, "Under Russian President
Putin, energy has emerged as a tool for strategic leverage, in effect replacing the traditional
Russian reliance on the 'hard power' of its military with a new exercise in Russia's 'soft
power' .,,215
Thus, the changing fortunes of the respective Chinese and Japanese bids for the Russian
pipeline have swung in favour of one and then the other as the Russian government vacillates
between the two offers. In this way, both countries are offering increasingly sweeter deals to
try and sway Moscow to accept their respective preferred pipeline route. The fate of the
Chinese Daqing line appeared to be in doubt following the arrest and imprisonment of Yukos
chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October 2003 for unpaid back taxes. Khodorkovsky, who
had championed the Chinese pipeline, appeared to be a victim ofan attempt by the Kremlin
to re-exert influence over the relatively newly privatised oil companies. The Economist
points out that "in Russia's energy-dominated economy, a private pipeline would be
tantamount to privatised foreign policy.,,216 As a result, Khodorkovsky's attempt to break the
state's pipeline monopoly became a further variable in the complex interstate competition
between China and Japan for access to Russian oil. On the other hand, Moscow continues to
wring concessions out of China and Japan, such as raising support for Russia's bid to join the
World Trade Organisation. Nevertheless, as Lee summarises, "the rivalry between China
215 Richard Giragosian, "Sino-Japanese competition for Russia's far east oil pipeline project", Institute for
the Analysis ofGlobal Security, available at http://www.iags.org/nOI19063.htm
216 The Economist, "King Solomon's pipes; Russian oil", (7 May 2005), volume 375, issue 8425
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and Japan and the stand-off between the Kremlin and Khodorkovsky led to an unlimited
delay to reach a final decision on the routing of the pipeline.,,217
Over the past few years the Kremlin has continued to be indecisive over which route to give
preference, including tabling an option of building both routes and supplying Nakhodka and
Daqing. However, while the notion of sharing the pipeline has been accepted in principle,
both China and Japan insist that 'their' route be built first - fearing that once the oil revenue
is flowing the Russian government will be disinclined to continue building the other section
of the pipeline. In November 2005, President Putin visited Japan and made reassuring noises
by saying his country is committed to building a pipeline from Siberia to the Pacific.
Speaking at a meeting with Japanese and Russian business leaders he said, "We plan to build
the pipeline to the Pacific coast with eventual supplies to the Asia-Pacific region including
Japan.,,218 In addition, during Putin's three day visit to Japan, the Japanese government
signed an agreement endorsing Russia's bid to join the WTO, and it appeared the pipeline
issue had been finalised. Indeed, on the 16th of March 2006, Bloomberg News reported that
while Russia planned to ship more oil to China by rail, the state-owned pipeline operator
Transneft was planning to build an oil pipeline to the Pacific.219
However, by the 22nd of March 2006 while on a visit to China, President Putin hinted that he
now favours a Chinese route for the pipeline. The BBC reported that Russia's energy
217 Lee Pak K. "China's quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline?", The Pacific Review, volume 18,
number 2, June 2005, p.277
218 BBC News, "Putin reassures Japan on pipeline", (21 Nov 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi!world!asia-
pacifici4455542.stm
219 Rob Delaney, "Russia to send more oil to China", Bloomberg News, (16 March 2006),
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03i16!bloomberg!sxoil.php
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minister told the Russian news agency Tass that the link to China could be constructed by the
end of 2008,220 thereby continuing the contentious tug-of-war between China and Japan and
continuing the Russian policy of indecision. In commenting on the latest change in Russian
policy, Koliandre noted that "Russia will be keen to hang onto its polygamous energy export
policy. In an effort to avoid throwing in its lot with just one contender, it is likely to keep
trying to promise more and deliver less.,,22I
Therefore, while uncertainty continues to overshadow the various options for the Russian
pipeline, China's compelling demand for energy resources and the mutual Sino-Japanese
need for diversification ofoil supplies carry on unabated. With the outcome of the Daqing
project still doubtful, China is intensifying its efforts to formulate meaningful ties with the
oil-rich Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan. The Economist reports a projected oil
pipeline linking the eastern Chinese province of Xingjian with existing Kazakh oil
infrastructure around the Caspian Sea as being re-examined because of the doubts over the
Daqing pipeline. Originally shelved due the prohibitive US$ 3 billion price tag that would
only bring the oil to the undeveloped province of Xingjian - requiring a further US$ 15
billion in pipeline investment to service the booming cities along China's east coast,222 the
strategic and economic demands for oil from Kazakhstan are making the project viable in the
eyes of the Chinese. As energy consultant Scott Roberts explains however, while the costs
220 BBC News, "Putin hints at China oil pipeline", (22 March 2006), http://news.bbc.co.lIk/l/hi/world/asia-
pacific/483 I624.stm
221 Alexander Koliandre, "Russia keeps China energy options open", BBC News, (22 March 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.ukll/hi/bllsiness/4830768.stm
222 The Economist, "In the pipeline; The oil wars", (I May 2004), volume 371, issue 8373
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are high, "there is a strategic value at stake. China's oil security is increasingly important to
its overall economic and political security.,,223
Chinese investment and interest in the Kazakh oil industry began in 1990s with investments
driven by the possibility ofoverland oil importation routes. As Jaffe and Lewis confirm, the
overland route held much appeal for the Chinese because it "would avoid any security risks
associated with long supply lines by tanker from the Persian Gulf." Indeed, as they continue
to note, "China is said to view its activities in Central Asia as a potential land bridge to the
Persian Gulf.,,224 While sections of the pipeline have been completed, the project has never
been completed. In fact, some analysts argue that either the final segment of the pipeline was
used as a Chinese bargaining chip in negotiations with the Russians, or that the Chinese have
paid well above market value for their Central Asian investments and are reluctant to invest
more while the possibility of the Russian Daqing line is still open. Regardless, Central Asia
will undoubtedly continue to be an important factor in China's quest to meet its growing
energy demands and to ensure its energy security.
However, beyond issues of the cost effectiveness ofoil pipelines from Kazakhstan, Lee notes
the greater strategic and geopolitical motives of China's eagerness to exert influence and
guarantee access to energy resources from Central Asia.
China rekindled its interest in Central Asia after September
200 I. Since then, the Chinese government has been concerned
about US military expansion into Central Asia. The
increasingly powerful presence of the US in the region,
Chinese security analysts believe, would enable the US to
m Scott Roberts, quoted in The Economist, "In the pipeline; The oil wars", (I May 2004), volume 371,
issue 8373
224 Jaffe & Lewis, "Beijing's oil diplomacy", Survival, volume 44, issue 1,2002, p. 125
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extend its control over oil from the Middle East to Central Asia,
and hence would have an adverse impact on China's oil as well
as national security.225
Thus, China's growing search for energy resources amongst its western neighbours is based
on a complex set of variables related to regional stability and China's energy security. As
Swanstrom226 explains, the Chinese do want natural resources but they are also concerned
with securing their borders, ensuring political stability across the region, and increasing their
influence in a region traditionally considered well within Russia's sphere of influence.
Therefore, Russia's tenuous grip on the Central Asian states since the break up of the Soviet
Union has paved the way for outsiders - including the Americans - to come in; however, the
Chinese have been the most effective because of their comprehensive regional, economic and
security interests. Swanstrom notes that Russian domestic weaknesses have allowed other
actors an opportunity to exert influence in the region, "but the Americans and Europeans
have not taken the opportunity to the same extent the Chinese have.,,227
China's expansionist drive into Central Asia, while propelled by its energy demands, is
having significant political repercussions in the region - both in terms of Chinese support for
various authoritarian regimes and in terms of exposing underlying fears of China's intentions
in Central Asia. As Bransten and Lelyveld note, "on the security front, Beijing has found
eager partners in Central Asia's authoritarian leaders.,,228 Beijing, like its western neighbours,
fears the rise of Islamic militancy and regional conflict spreading to its largely Muslim
225 Lee Pak K. "China's quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline?", The Pac(fic Review, volume 18,
number 2, June 2005, p.271
226 Niklas Swanstrom, quoted in Bransten & Lelyveld, "The dragon in Central Asia, Part one: The hunt for
friends and oil", Asia Times, (6 June 2006), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinalFK7JAd03.html
227 Ibid
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province ofXingjian. In this regard, there has been a marked increase in military and police
cooperation alongside increased Chinese investment and influence in the region.
However, just as Russia's energy relationship with China is fraught with concerns about the
nature and extent of China's influence in the Russian Far East and its irredentist ambitions in
Siberia, so too are the former Soviet states wary of China's growth - despite the obvious
economic benefits. As Bransten and Lelyveld point out, "there is a latent fear, especially in
the countries bordering China, that Beijing is hungry for land. And if that is the case, even a
small migration of Chinese to the region would swamp the local populations.,,229 These
concerns are obviously dismissed in Beijing but Bransten and Lelyveld go on to quote Murat
Auezov, the former Kazakh Ambassador to China as noting undiplomatically, "I know
Chinese culture. We should not believe anything the Chinese say ... As a historian, I'm
telling you that 19th century China, 20th century China and 21 st century China are three
different Chinas. But what unites them is a desire to expand their territories.,,23o
Thus, the complexities of China's energy-driven policies in Central Asia are as multifaceted
as they are with Russia. The historical perspective that colours relations in the region are
aspects of the same dynamic that continues to impact on Sino-Japanese relations. In this
regard, China's efforts to guarantee access to Kazakh oil and enhance its political influence
in the region is not going unnoticed in Japan, where energy issues are increasingly becoming
central to that country's foreign policy objectives. The Asahi Shimbun reports that in June
2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso met with representatives offour Central Asian
229 1bid
230 Murat Auezov, quoted in Bransten & Lelyveld, "The dragon in Central Asia, Part one: The hunt for
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states to sign an action plan for regional cooperation to combat terrorism and secure stable
energy supplies. Under consideration, was "Japan's cooperation in building alternative oil
and natural gas transportation routes, such as roads or pipelines, which would bypass
Russia." The newspaper goes on to quote officials as saying "this would also help secure
stable energy sources for oil hungry Japan.,,23I
Thus, the extent of Sino-Japanese energy competition extends across the region as both
countries look to diversify and ensure secure access to oil and gas. Japan's traditional
reliance on Middle Eastern suppliers is raising concerns in Japan in the context of increasing
instability in Iraq and mounting tensions over Iran's nuclear program. These fears are only
amplified by the prospect of growing Chinese demand for energy and its effects on world oil
prices, as well as Japan's ability to access vital sources of oil in a global environment marked
by increasing scarcity driven by growing demand in the massive emerging markets of China
and India. Thus, with ongoing uncertainty over access to Siberian oil, and perceptions of a
Chinese geographic and cultural advantage in Central Asia, Japan is turning to Africa and
Latin America in an attempt to break its near complete reliance on Middle Eastern oil. China
however, driven by the socio-political needs that underpin the importance of maintaining its
rapid economic growth and with marked annual increases in its energy import needs,
continues to place access to energy resources at the top of its foreign policy objectives. This
is especially true when considering China's growing relationship with Africa and Latin
America.
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Africa and Latin America
The importance of energy resources in the formulation of foreign policy is best illustrated in
terms of China's growing relationship with a variety of African states. Africa's rich supply
ofcommodities, including oil and gas, are finding a welcome market in China's booming
manufacturing economy. While still smaller (in overall terms) than both the US and
Japanese manufacturing sectors, the relative growth of Chinese demand has become very
significant. Notably, the growing demand of the Chinese economy is manifesting itself in
terms of China's foreign policy in Africa, where, beyond geopolitical issues such as China's
desire to maintain a leadership role in the developing world, access to commodities and
primary energy resources has become central to Chinese diplomatic efforts on the continent.
In the context of energy-based Sino-Japanese rivalry in Africa, Eisenman notes that
significantly, 2005 saw China displace Japan as the second largest importer of African oil
after the United States. However, despite falling total petroleum imports, Japan's African
supplies grew by nearly 20 percent in 2004, while over the same period Chinese imports
grew by more that 35 percent.232 Thus, Africa's role in Sino-Japanese energy competition is
considerable, and the political and economic repercussions of China-Japan interaction with
the continent impact not only on patterns of energy rivalry in East Asia, but significantly
influence Africa's political and developmental landscape.
m Joshua Eisenman, "Sino-Japanese oil rivalry spills into Africa", Centre for Strategic and International
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Sino-Japanese energy competition is premised upon the relatively sudden appearance of
China as an important player in the world's energy markets, combined with the troubled
historical perspective that forms the foundation of their mutual understanding. In this regard,
Africa best illustrates not only China's recent emergence as a noteworthy importer of African
oil, but also demonstrates the important role that Chinese imports play in the economies of
many African countries. As Eisenman notes, "Beijing's purchases are a significant share of
African oil producers' exports. Beijing imports a quarter of Angola's oil, 60 percent of
Sudan's and an increasing percent from Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Gabon.,,233 Thus,
when considering the importance of petroleum exports as a share of Gross Domestic Product,
the significance of China to the economies of these countries becomes apparent.
Figure 4.4
Chinese oil imports by region (per cent)234
1990 1997 2001
Middle East 39.4 47.5 56
Asia Pacific 60.6 26.2 14
Africa 0 16.7 23
Other (Europe & 0 9.6 7
Central Asia)
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234 IngolfKiesow, "China's quest for energy; impact upon foreign and security policy", Swedish Defence
Research Agency, (November 2004) available online: http://www.foi.se/lIpload/english/reports/chinas-
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As figure 4.4 indicates, Chinese oil imports from Africa grew markedly between 1990 and
2001. Eisenman estimates that in 2005, Africa accounted for 30 percent of China's oil
imports.235 Thus, with the potential for significant growth in Africa's energy sector, the
political importance of the continent in China is growing.
The extent and nature of increasing Chinese influence in Africa is being recognised in Japan,
where an Asahi Shimbun report from May 2006 notes that China is outstripping Japan in the
diplomatic race to woo Africa.236 Additionally, Tokyo's emphasis on democratic reform and
human rights in Africa largely mirrors American or European views and is diametrically
opposed to the Chinese policy of non-involvement in the internal affairs of African countries.
Thus, Sino-Japanese energy rivalry in Africa is being played out against this complex
geopolitical and ideological background.
However, while China's relationship with Africa in 2006 is largely determined in terms of
feeding African minerals and energy resources to its fast-growing economy, and disregarding
the political circumstances in many of those countries, it shares many compellingly similar
traits with Japan's relationship with the continent at the height of its own economic explosion
in the I 960s and 1970s. As Morikawa explains,
Natural resources diplomacy became the focus of Japan's
attention in Black Africa from the latter half of the 1960s
onwards. As the phenomenal growth of its capitalism took
off, Japan became extremely worried about the possibility of
a natural resource crisis. Against this background, its natural
d· I b 237resources Ip omacy was om... '
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Japan's primary focus in Africa during those years was obtaining base metals such as iron
ore, copper ore and bauxite, products which are now fuelling China's economic expansion.
Yet, it is Beijing's single-minded pursuit of access to energy resources in Africa that has
drawn the most comment in the context of Chinese political support for African regimes
roundly criticised in the West. These moves by China, however, reflect both the
authoritarian aspects of its own political structures and the pressing economic imperatives
that underlie not only Chinese relations with Africa but also that once drove Japanese foreign
policy objectives, and in the context of increasing Sino-Japanese energy competition, could
again become central to policy formation.
Nester describes Japanese foreign policy in the developing world as "a neomercantilist
strategy of concentrating on securing Japan's regional geoeconomic interests while skirting
any political entanglements.,,238 These views of Japan's resource diplomacy often focus on
the high levels of trade that occurred between Japan and Apartheid South Africa, and the
cynical economic prerogatives that dominated foreign policy objectives at the expense of
more ethical concerns. However, in 2006, it is China which is experiencing exponential
economic growth and, consequently, the scramble to secure mineral and energy rights is
being pushed to the forefront of Chinese foreign policy in Africa - resulting in political and
economic support for a number of African regimes whose democratic or human rights
records are widely criticised in the West.
23R William R. Nester, Japan and the third world - patterns power prospects, London: Macmillan, 1992, p.
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However, Chinese interaction with Africa has largely been characterised by its broadly
consistent policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. This
position contrasts sharply with the Western (and recently Japanese) approach ofexpending
considerable effort on rhetoric around issues of democratisation and human rights. However,
these efforts are focused against a history ofextensive interference in Africa, and support for
widely unpopular regimes such as that of Apartheid South Africa or Mobutu Sese Seko in the
former Zaire. Thus, the absence of a 'moralistic' dimension to Chinese moves in Africa has
resonated positively with African leaders, who have for decades witnessed Western powers
pursue narrow self-interest and glaringly inconsistent policies with regard the domestic
political environment in many African states. In this light, Chinese political support for
countries such as Sudan or Zimbabwe - while drawing increasing criticism in the West-
highlights the continuity of its policy of non-interference and arguably strengthens its
position in the eyes of many of Africa's leaders.
Africa's strategic importance in terms of mineral and energy resources is illustrated by the
fact that Chinese President Hu Jintao visited key oil-producing states in 2006 - his second
visit to Africa in three years. In addition, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao also toured the continent in 2006. In describing Foreign Minister Li's
visit to Africa in January 2006, McGivering noted that "there is no doubt of Africa's
importance in fuelling China's remarkable growth. China's rapacious energy needs are
increasingly shaping its foreign policy, especially in regions like Africa, rich in natural
resources and eager for investment.,,239 McGivering adds that China's state media claims the
239 Jill McGivering, "China's growing focus on Africa", BBC News, (17 January 2006),
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volume of trade between China and Africa has quadrupled over the past five years to reach
approximately US$ 37 billion - including an "estimated 700 Chinese-funded ventures, many
in the field of energy and natural resources: oil and gas development, copper, cobalt, coal,
and gold mining.,,24o
Chinese President Hu's visit to Africa in April 2006 included a second visit to Nigeria in two
years where a significant oil deal was signed and Hu was given the honour of addressing a
sitting of both houses of parliament. The US$ 2 billion oil deal included the Chinese
purchase of a controll ing stake in the 110,000 barrel a day Kaduna oil refinery and the offer
of first refusal to China's state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
for a quartet of exploration blocks in the Niger Delta.241 In addition, CNOOC completed a
US$ 2.3 billion purchase of a 45 percent stake in an existing offshore oil field,242 and China
pledged to invest US$4 billion dollars in oil and infrastructure projects in Nigeria.243 As the
BBC goes on to report, beyond oil deals, China strengthened its ties with Nigeria by lending
US$I billion towards modernising Nigeria's railways they note, "the deal is the latest
example of China looking to tighten relations with oil-producer countries" so as to secure
steady energy supplies for its booming economy.244
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China's existing ties with African oil producers include Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon
and Angola. However, the visit in June 2006 of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to
Brazzaville in the Republic of the Congo to discuss oil exploration in the GulfofGuinea
indicates China's intentions of furthering its energy ambitions in Africa.245 Thus, the extent
of high-profile Chinese governmental visits to Africa points to the nature of China's energy
diplomacy on the continent, based around the formation of bilateral ties and large-scale
investment in oil infrastructure, supplemented by aid and trade deals. Beijing's cultivation of
relationships with oil-producing African states allows for Chinese state-owned oil companies
to explore, secure, extract, process and finally ship African crude. The BBC reports that
China-Africa trade increased by 39 percent in the first ten months of2005. Additionally,
over the same period China invested US$175 million in African countries and scrapped
tariffs on 190 kinds of imported goods from 28 of Africa's least developed countries.246
However, it is the nature of China's energy-driven bilateral relations in Africa that are not
only drawing criticism from western nations but also highlighting the increasing gulf in Sino-
Japanese policies with regard Africa. Whilst Japanese policy in Africa from the 1960s to the
1990s can be described as neo-mercantilist and driven by the pursuit of mineral resources, in
2006 Japan operates in line with its position in the G8 - the global club of rich nations. In
this regard, Japan's relationship with Africa in recent years has been determined in line with
the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which is centred on
three policy 'pillars', consolidation of peace, poverty reduction through economic growth
245 BBC News, "Chinese PM announces Ghana loan", (19 June 2006),
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and human centred development.247 However, despite its seemingly noble intents,
Cornelissen and Taylor assert that "in essence, Japan's sponsorship and involvement in the
entire TlCAD enterprise is one which elevates its 'non-Westernness' - first as an advanced
nation discerned by its attempts to counter' Afro-pessimism'; second, as with China, through
a distinct extra-Western appeal.,,248 In addition, it could be argued that Japan's attempts to
reflect a less instrumentalist relationship with Africa is intended to mitigate its neo-
mercantilist reputation, and to shadow - for the sake of expediency - Western policies with
regard to democratisation or human rights.
In an address at the headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa in May 2006,
Prime Minister Koizumi spoke of Japan's commitment to assist the AU in dealing with the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, extending cooperation in areas such as trade, investment
promotion and infrastructure development as well the fight against AIDS on the continent.
However, as an editorial in the Japan Times noted,
It is said that Mr. Koizumi's Africa visit was designed to get
cooperation from African countries in its bid to become a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and to counter
China's manoeuvres in Africa. Shortly before Mr. Koizumi's
Africa visit, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Morocco,
Nigeria and Kenya and signed major business deals apparently
aimed at facilitating the fast-growing Chinese economy's access
to African resources and markets.249
Koizumi's visit to Africa and subsequent promises of increased trade and aid followed after
the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles where Japan agreed to increase its Official Development
247Japan Times, "Editorial: Apolitical support to Africa", (IS May 2006), http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/ed20060515a) .html
248 Scarlett Comelissen & [an Taylor, "The political economy of China and Japan's relationship with
Africa: a comparative perspective", The Pacific Review, volume) 3, number 4, 2000, p. 621
249[bid
109
Assistance (ODA) by US$ 10 billion over the next ten years. Also, at the Asia Africa summit
held in Jakarta in April 2005, where Japan committed to doubling the amount of aid directed
towards Africa over the next three years.250 These efforts, however, whilst in line with
general commitments from developed countries to increase aid to Africa appear to have made
little impact with regard to combating China's increasing influence in Africa.
As the Asahi Shimbun points out, apart from large-scale purchases of Africa's energy
resources, China also pledged US$ 10 billion in loans and aid to developing countries over
the next three years and stressed its resolve and commitment towards Africa.2 51 The
newspaper goes on to point out that Beijing's involvement in the continent also extends to
military aid and that China does not try to shape political systems. In this regard, China's
economic and political influence in Africa is gaining ground in a global environment where
aid is increasingly tied to commitments around human rights or democratic reforms. General
African enthusiasm for China's growing role on the world stage is encapsulated by Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo who, the Asahi Shimbun reports, said that China will lead the
world this century, and that Nigeria intends to be right behind China.252
However, as Comelissen and Taylor note, the strategic importance of Africa for both China
and Japan is considerable, and extends beyond both countries' resource-driven involvement
on the continent.
As such, both countries view the African continent as a
useful (albeit latent) buttress to their respective political
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and diplomatic goals in the international system, as well as
satisfying various economic needs. Hence both countries
deploy aid, increasingly in partnership with commercial
activity in order to facilitate a sympathetic support base on
the continent. By doing so, both countries attempt to
cultivate the national elites of African countries in order to
build up these support constituencies so that they may
utilise theses at the multilaterallevel.253
While a realist reading of international relations would point to instrumental factors
underpinning many facets of state interaction, including the provision of aid and
development loans, China's pragmatic energy-driven diplomacy in Africa appears to fully
encapsulate these qualities. As Cornelissen and Taylor again assert, "China's economic
dealings with most African countries are today based on a cool evaluation of their perceived
economic and political potential.,,254 Many believe that China's activities on the continent
have surpassed Japan's neo-mercantilist commodity-driven foreign policy of the 1960s and
1970s. China's permanent seat at the UN Security Council and increasing economic clout -
driven by fast-growing energy demands, gives China unparalleled advantages in nurturing
energy relationships in Africa.
In the post-cold war environment where the binary divisions that characterised state
interaction are not present and the neoliberal economic model is ideologically uncontested,
China's possible future challenge to the present hegemonic order is being welcomed in
Africa. In a continent with a long history of Western dominance and exploitation, Africa's
growing economic relationship with China is built on a perception of shared values. As
Taylor describes, "a Chinese diplomat in Africa asserted in a claim shared by many African
253 Scarlett Comelissen & lan Taylor, "The political economy of China and Japan's relationship with
Africa: a comparative perspective", The Pacific Review, volume 13, number 4, 2000, p.616
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leaders, human rights such as 'economic rights' and 'rights of subsistence' are the main
priority of developing nations and take precedence over personal, individual rights as
conceptualised in the West.,,255
In this regard, the 2005 unveiling of Beijing's official guideline with regard to Africa is
significant. Titled 'China's African Policy', the document sets out the principles of Sino-
African state interaction and is much in keeping with China's foreign policy in general.
Emphasizing what China terms the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the document
enshrines mutual territorial respect, non-aggression and non-interference in each others
internal affairs. As McGivering notes with regard to the document, "that is a much less
constraining philosophy than that of most Western governments - who may have ethical
concerns about doing business with countries with non-democratic governments and/or
human rights concerns.,,256 McGivering's claims about Western ethical concerns
notwithstanding, evidence abounds that demonstrate clearly that Western states - or Japan-
have rarely ever been constrained from doing business with non-democratic or rights abusing
states in Africa when any of their important interests was at stake.
Still, beyond China's relationship with states such as Sudan or Zimbabwe, which have been
shunned internationally, many argue that the ready flow of Chinese cash into the continent is
exacerbating existing governmental weaknesses. As the BBC reports with regard China's
increasing investments in Angola's oil industry, "the combination ofcorruption and Chinese
255 Jan Taylor, "China's foreign policy towards Africa in the 199Os", The Journal ofModern African
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cash is damaging, and that this source of new funds gives Angola the opportunity to ignore
the IMF's recommendations on transparency and accountability.,,257 Timberg reiterates this
point when he notes that the influx of cash into Angola has further stiffened the
government's resolve against outside pressure - mostly from the West - to reform.258
Yet, perhaps it is Sudan which best encapsulates the divergent Sino-Japanese policies in
Africa today. Tokyo's emphasis on democratic reform and human rights stems from a 2002
task force on foreign relations report which argued: "bringing about democracy and good
governance in Africa is essential for world stability and prosperity.,,259 The Koizumi
administration has also provided US$ 2 million towards training on international human
rights law to AU troops in Sudan260 and shown intent to vote along the lines of the Western
powers with regard to imposing sanctions against the Khartoum government.
Sudan, however, also represents the nexus of China's energy diplomacy and policy of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of states. While the argument could be put forward that
the Chinese policy of non-interference is geared towards deflecting attention from its own
authoritarian structures and policies in Tibet or Xingjian, the extent of China's investment in
Sudan's oil industry is significant and, as such, must be considered a vital element in the
formation of Chinese foreign policy towards Sudan. According to Ernest Wilson's testimony
before the sub-committee on Africa at the US House of Representatives in July 2005, Sudan
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alone provides five percent of China's oil imports and Chinese workers have constructed a
1,600 km pipeline facilitating oil exports. 261 In addition, thirteen of the fifteen most
significant foreign companies in Sudan are Chinese and Kenny notes that China is also
constructing an oil refinery in Khartoum and a 750 km pipeline from the Kordofan oilfield to
the coast.262
However, beyond the increasing energy-based relationship, it is the political support that
China lends countries such as Sudan, which continues to draw criticism. As Wilson
describes, "When a proposal came before the UN (resolution 1564) to impose an arms
embargo on the Sudanese government, China threatened to impose a veto, then watered
down the language, then cast an abstaining vote.,,263 Chinese obstruction ism with regard to
UN action in Darfur has continued to raise fears in the West about the negative costs for
democracy or human rights in Africa as a result of China's growing influence on the
continent - while strengthening China's position due to the many African countries who are
at odds with the West over the characterisation of what is happening in Darfur. Indeed, as
the head of Human Rights Watch in Africa Peter Takirambudde noted, China will pursue
resources wherever they may be, and in doing so "they see no evil. They hear no evil. That is
very bad for Africans.,,264 A view that the Chinese are eager to dispel, when addressing the
Nigerian National Assembly, Chinese President Hu asserted that "China's development will
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not pose a threat to anyone. On the contrary, it wilI bring more development opportunities to
the world.,,265
Thus beyond Africa, China's thirst for oil is at the forefront of its diplomacy in Latin
America. As Watson points out, Latin America is still below Africa in terms of Chinese
strategic interests, but is getting more attention,
China has a targeted need to find energy resources ... they are
interested in oil contracts in Venezuela, Ecuador and
Colombia...They want to cultivate a relationships that will put
them in a more favourable situation and they want to show Latin
American nations that they will treat them as sovereigns, that
they won't preach to them and they will act as partners.266
This message is being received warmly by virulently anti-US regimes such as Hugo
Chavez's in Venezuela - a nation also rich with oil reserves.
Indeed, it should be borne in mind that China's energy-driven economic and political
activities in Latin America are focused against the backdrop of deep resentment at the history
of American interference in the affairs of the region. Nationalist rhetoric directed against
'Yanqui' imperialism will inevitably find a receptive audience, and in this sense, the
emergence of China as a possible future counterbalance to American hegemony must be
understood as being built on the strong foundation of deeply felt antagonism towards the US
for its history of interference in regional affairs. The Wall Street Journal notes that beyond
energy issues, China has constructed a cyber-warfare complex in Cuba to monitor US
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satellite communications, and is building a strong strategic relationship with Brazil, the
regional powerhouse: "The growing relationship between Brazil and China is viewed as two
emerging powers that can benefit each other vis-a-vis the U.S.,,267
China's efforts to construct meaningful economic and political relationships in Latin
America follow a similar pattern of political non-interference in domestic affairs to those that
are driving China's Africa policy. Yet, Latin America is still well within the sphere of
influence of the United States, and combined with the cost of shipping oil over the much
greater distances from Latin America, Africa will continue to remain strategically vital to
China's energy policies.
As a result, China's energy ambitions in Africa, whilst not entirely uncontested, lack the
geopolitical complications that characterise China's efforts in securing oil and gas in Russia,
Central Asia or Latin America. However, as Japan looks to diversify its sources of supply
away from its overwhelming dependence on the Middle East, Africa is becoming more
significant not only as a supplier of energy resources but as a platform for criticising Chinese
policy. The historically difficult nature of Sino-Japanese relations, and the apparent use of
the 'history card' by China in wringing concessions from Japan means that the Japanese
media is quick to highlight the nature of Chinese energy policy in Africa. As Eisenman
points out, "China's methods are not lost on the Japanese media ... in an August (2005)
editorial, the Sankei Shimbun warned that China chooses to do business with supporters of
267 Wall Street Journal, "Americas: The Middle kingdom in Latin America", Sept 32004
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terrorism and anti-democratic African states."268 These sentiments must be viewed in
conjunction with the promotion of democracy message that Koizumi has continued to
reiterate with regard to Africa. Indeed, Japan's former chief Cabinet Secretary and current
Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, publicly criticised China when he said that the two countries do
not share fundamental values about freedom and human rights.269 However, while Japan's
neo-mercantilist record in Africa and long history ofdoing business with unsavoury regimes
is well noted, this type of political rhetoric is significant in that it highlights the increasing
Sino-Japanese competition in Africa.
Consequently, as Sino-Japanese energy competition moves beyond East Asia, the politico-
economic repercussions of the different approaches employed by the two countries in
formulating foreign policy will continue to grow. The long-term effects of China's policies
in Africa today can only be based on guess-work and are invariably influenced by an element
of ideological bias with regard to one's position on ethical business practices. In addition,
Japan's history ofneo-mercantilist economic activity in Africa must also be factored in when
assessing the importance of human rights and democracy in the formulation of its Africa
policy today. However as Schraeder notes, "the evolution of Japanese involvement in Africa
from the early 1980s to the present demonstrates Japan's intention to translate its
extraordinary economic power into global influence worthy of a political and economic
superpower."no Thus today, China's concerted drive to acquire oil and gas in Africa has
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become another element in the complex framework of Sino-Japanese energy competition.
The mutually divergent positions that China and Japan hold with regard to the political
dimensions of economic expansion into Africa reiterate and underscore the complex nature




Multi-polar power d!)namics into the twent!)-first centur!j
When considering the factors that will determine the twenty first century and the possibility
of realising the Pacific Century, the nature of Sino-Japanese relations into the future becomes
paramount. In attempting to plot the geopolitical map of East Asia into the future, one is
beset by the challenge of determining adequately the outcomes of events that are occurring
now, and moving beyond an understanding of interstate relations based on the concept of
precedent. East Asia has never experienced two major power centres, and the varied
processes of globalisation that are drawing states closer together through greater cultural
interchange, economic exchange and interdependence are still in their formative stages and
can offer no models upon which to determine the future course of interstate relations.
Thus, although the nature and future of Sino-Japanese interactions are both hugely important
regionally and in a globally they remain difficult to forecast accurately because of the
ambiguities and complexities that characterise their relations today. As Kupchan notes,
"deep political cleavages still exist in East Asia," 271 which serve in the short term, to
exacerbate the risk of intraregional balancing and rivalry. However, he envisages that a level
271 Charles Kupchan, "Empires and Geopolitical Competition", in Crocker, Hampson and Aall, Turbulenl
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of rapprochement would occur over time between the two states that could see the East Asian
region emerge as a powerhouse in a future multi-polar global power alignment. Nevertheless,
while the future actions and interactions of Japan and China have by no means a universally
agreed upon set of outcomes, the nature of energy-driven interstate tensions in 2006,
compounded by realist understandings of security dilemma and formulated in terms of
historical perspectives suggests that the fast-growing Chinese demand for energy resources,
namely oil and gas, will continue to exacerbate tense relations with Japan, creating the
potential for open conflict in the foreseeable future.
The role of history and a historically based perception and understanding of current actions is
a hugely important factor in determining the nature of modern Sino-Japanese relations. The
historical basis of mistrust and antagonism is kept alive through not only repeated Chinese
demands that Japan apologise further for its war-time atrocities, and apparent Japanese
unwillingness to do as demanded, but also by perceived acts of Japanese insensitivity such as
visits by its Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni shrine or display of selective memory in new
Japanese school history textbooks, which invariably lead to rounds of recrimination from
China. The thread of history that runs through China-Japan interactions is closely linked
with that of nationalism, which is developing as an important factor in understanding the
geopolitical connection between the two states.
Many observers have noted that following the end of the Cold War and the adoption of
'capitalism with a socialist face' by the communist rulers in Beijing, the nation has been
without the all-important uniting ideology that communism had offered, and into this void
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has moved a distinctly anti-Japanese brand of nationalism that focuses on history, unity, and
the bravery of Chinese opposition to Japanese invaders. Mclntosh describes a poster held at
an anti-Japan rally in the mid-1980s, which read: "I used to be a Japanese imperialist,
decapitating 50 people ... but now I'm selling you colour televisions." 272 Thus, the strands
of history and nationalism reinforce each other to build a foundation ofanimosity in Sino-
Japanese relations, and are creating a backlash of nationalist impetus in Japan that is central
to the Japanese recognition of its regional power and influence and has brought energy
competition into stark focus.
As Agakimi notes, "Japan is in the midst of a grand social transformation. Political manners,
economic rules, patterns ofeveryday life and international relations are all in flux. The last
time Japan saw change of great magnitude was after the defeat in World War 11.,,273 Yet as
Japan enters the twenty first century, it lacks an American blueprint for its future of the sort
that defined the post-I 945 period, and into this space Agakimi describes the rise ofan
assertive nationalism among young Japanese. Indeed, as Agakimi notes, central to this
impetus is a growing mistrust of China and its intentions: "a variety of opinion polls show the
vast majority of Japanese concerned about their country's relations with China. Reacting to
media reports on anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, those who hold unfavourable
feelings toward China have surged more than 70 percent.,,274
m Malcolm McJntosh, Japan re-armed, London: Frances Pinter, 1986, p.1 J8




It is against this backdrop of rising mutually antagonistic nationalisms that Sino-Japanese
energy competition must be understood. The exponential growth in China's economy is
resulting in growing demand for oil and gas from the same energy exporting markets that
supply Japan. Thus, when considering the historically-based political nature of present Sino-
Japanese relations, and the near total Japanese dependence on imported fuels, the
significance of energy security in the context of regional instability becomes apparent. In
June 2006, the Japanese government released its New National Energy Strategy, a report
outlining Japan's energy policies. As the Yomiuri Shimbun notes, the report is noteworthy
for its emphasis on energy security as compared to previous reports, as well as mentioning
the increasing international competition for natural resources with China.275 Thus, as energy
security becomes an increasingly important factor in foreign policy formation, the various
aspects of Sino-Japanese rivalry from territorial disputes to access to Russian oil accentuates
the role of energy concerns in a broad understanding of China-Japan interaction and the
possibility of present tension leading to conflict.
Sino-Japanese relations today contain not only the full spectrum of realist concerns about
state capabilities and motives but also major issues about an economic relationship that is as
competitive as it is complementary. As such, Japanese fears regarding both the Chinese
irredentism in the South China Sea as well as its military expansion are matched by Chinese
fears of Japanese remilitarisation and the departure of US troops from the region. It is
against this backdrop that the complex variables of energy competition and moves to secure
energy security are occurring. As Giragosian points out, Japan's expanding regional role and
275 Yomiuri Shimbun, "New energy strategy focuses on security", (5 June 2006),
http://www..yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/2006060STDY0400S.htm
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the simultaneous reassessment of its threat environment has made energy competition part of
a broader dynamic in Sino-Japanese relations. However, Giragosian maintains that
"although the emergence of a vibrant and heated Chinese nationalism has exhibited strident
anti-Japanese feeling, it has been the continued dispute over natural gas reserves in the East
China Sea that has most recently fuelled Japanese-Chinese rivalry.,,276
Thus, the nature of Sino-Japanese energy rivalry into the future, while difficult to forecast
accurately due to the numerous historical, economic and geopolitical variables that influence
the relationship, is likely to result in continuing legal, political and military outcomes driven
by the energy concerns that underpin the foreign policy imperatives of both countries. This
understanding of 'open conflict' must be understood in terms of the significant changes that
are occurring in both countries, in many instances fuelling Sino-Japanese rivalry. The
remarkable economic growth and apparent abandonment of socialism in China has changed
significantly the landscape of East Asia and can be seen as integral to the changes that are
occurring in Japan, as well as igniting the present energy competition that characterises the
relationship today.
Japan's geopolitical position is being debated in the context of the hugely popular pacifist
position that many Japanese believe should embody their national ethos. Yet, this pacifist
notion of national self-identity is increasingly under threat as political and economic
concerns facing the country have begun to influence mainstream political opinion, driven by
economic stagnation throughout the 1990s and continuing tension in the region. Thus, the
276 Richard Giragosian, "Sino-Japanese competition for Russia's far east oil pipeline project", Institute for
the Analysis ofGlobal Security, available at http://www.iags.org/n0119063.htlll
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increase in defence consciousness in Japan can be understood as the net result of the infusion
into the public discourse of leadership thinking with regard to the global energy imperatives
that the country faces. This changing environment is underscored and driven by a record
Liberal Democratic Party majority in the Diet, based on the popular Koizumi-Ied reform
platform.
Consequently, energy security has become central to the foreign policy objectives of both
countries and, apart from being a useful issue around which to raIly public support such as
over gas reserves in the contested Senkakul Diaoyu islands, the issue of energy competition
can be traced to the deterioration of relations between the two states. From openly
competing for access to Russian oil and tensions over the differing nature of Sino-Japanese
relations with regard to Africa; the issue of energy security is focused against the
militarization of the East and South China Seas and the shared perception that energy
competition in the region is a zero-sum game. As a result, a balance ofpower between the
land-based China and maritime-dependent Japan has not been achieved, and the increasing
demands of energy security in an environment of rising oil prices and economic dependence
on petroleum imports continues to raise the ante in an otherwise tense relationship. Thus,
while there is still uncertainty over just how powerful China will become and while Japan is
still hamstrung militarily, the threat of the unknown, compounded by historical antagonism
and based around protecting their respective national interests and the demands of energy




Central to this paper's formulation of remerging Japanese nationalism and increasingly
assertive foreign policy is the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.
However, Koizumi stepped down on the 30th of September 2006 to be replaced as Prime
Minister and leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party by former Chief Cabinet Secretary
Shinzo Abe. Thus, while it is too early to make any meaningful determination of how Abe's
leadership will affect relations with China in the context of energy competition between the
two states, it is significant to note that Abe has already indicated a willingness to continue
Koizumi's reforms, while at the same time attempting to repair the damaged relations with
China. In his first policy speech after replacing Koizumi, Abe spoke of overhauling Japan's
pacifist constitution and exercising the country's right to collective self defence. Promising
to "break away from the postwar regime", Abe highlighted four elements that will make up
"the beautiful nation, Japan" - significantly, one of these four elements was: "a nation that
continues to have energy to allow for growth in the future.,,277 Breaking with tradition, Abe
chose China as the destination of his first overseas official visit where he spoke
apologetically of Japan's history in the region and the importance of building "a relationship
277 Asahi Shimbun, "Abe stresses changes to constitution", (30 Sept 2006),
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200609290391.htmI
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of mutual benefit based on a common set of strategic interests.,,278 Thus, while the inherent
complexities of Si no-Japanese relations remain, it is doubtful that new leadership will
radically alter the nature of energy competition in East Asia in the context of the same energy
imperatives and geopolitical tensions.
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